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Introduction 
Politicians in the U.S. constantly depict themselves as defenders of their local 
constituencies against the political games of Washington D. C. and try to distance 
themselves from the positions taken by their parties. Being a political maverick who 
fights against the establishment is an electoral asset. Politicians in all democracies try 
to present themselves as representatives of the people in touch with their daily needs, 
but they vary in the extent to which they show allegiance to their voters or their 
parties. This study looks at how institutional arrangements influence the degrees of 
allegiance to voters or party leadership, as reflected in members of parliaments’ (MP) 
behavior on parliament floors as well as MP interaction with their constituents. It 
does so with the help of votes taken in 33 national parliaments as well as in depth 
interviews taken with members of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies.  
The study is grounded in the principal-agent theory, widely used in works on 
U.S. Congress (Ferejohn, 1999; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1999). In a nutshell, the theory says that when taking decisions on the 
Parliament floor a MP acts as an agent with two principals: her constituents and her 
party. Hence, the MP’s decisions are a function of her ideal position, the position of 
her constituents, and that of her party leaders. Institutional arrangements influence the 
extent to which the agent feels responsive to the two principals. The existing literature 
has extensively affirmed the role of institutional arrangements, and has focused 
primarily on the vote of confidence procedure and electoral rules (Diermeier and 
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Feddersen 1998; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Huber 1996; Collie 1985; Loewenberg 
and Patterson 1975; Weaver and Rockman 1993).  
Understanding how institutions influence the MP behavior through has 
normative consequences. There is however, no agreement on whether party or voters’ 
allegiance increases the quality of polity. Constituents want to know that their 
representatives put their needs above those of their parties, and consequently, 
politicians present themselves as defenders of popular interest for it is electorally 
rewarding. Leaders of the civil society, especially in the newly established 
democracies, also favor individual accountability for it is regarded as the antidote to 
corruption, cronyism and money politics. 
 Academics on the other hand, tend to favor parties over voters (Carey, 2009). 
They do so for a few reasons. First, cohesive parties are an integral part of indirect 
democracy for they assure voters that the decisions they make at the polls influence 
policy. Second, the degree of party unity influences government capacity to shape 
policy and avoid deadlock (Carey 2007). Third, the democratization literature has 
emphasized the importance of strong, institutionalized parties in the success of new 
democracies. Strong, united opposition parties can limit the abuses of those in power 
and increase the likelihood of peaceful transfer of power through democratic elections 
(see Jung and Shapiro 1995; Reynolds 2006; Huntington 1991). As a result, 
institutional arrangements leading to strong parties could become part of the 
repertoire of constitutional designers in new democracies. This study takes a non-
normative stance, looking at the role of institutions and leaving the normative 
conclusions to the reader. 
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Focusing solely on institutions may ignore some other important factors such 
as MPs attributes or cultural traits of voters (see Searing, 1985). From a normative 
perspective the focus on institutions rather than individuals is warranted, for 
institutions are easier to create and change. For instance, if we find that certain 
institutions lead to strong, united parties and if we accept that such parties are 
important for democratic order, we can include these institutions in the constitutional 
design of new democracies.  
The study is made of three chapters, each constituting empirical analyses of 
the relationship between institutional arrangements and MP behavior.  
The first chapter looks at the effect of institutions on party unity in 33 national 
legislatures. It is expected that institutions that empower constituents at the expense 
of party leaders lead to the emergence of mavericks, which translates into lower party 
unity. The analysis retests some of the hypotheses found in the literature, with the 
help of a database of votes from 33 national parliaments in Europe, Latin America 
and Asia. Following the existing literature I focus on the confidence procedure and 
electoral rules. While the literature has repeatedly affirmed the role of both it has not 
established which is more important or how they act in conjunction.  
The empirical tests in Chapter 1 are the first to confirm the relationship 
between the vote of confidence procedure and vote unity, a relationship previously 
affirmed yet never confirmed empirically. The confidence procedure emerges as the 
single most important explanans of vote unity in national parliaments. It influences 
votes directly through increasing the benefits of unity for both backbenchers and 
!!! W!
W!
leaders, and indirectly through the development of control mechanisms for party 
leaders, such as the allocation of campaign resources, influence over electoral lists, 
the allocation of leadership positions in parliament etc. These control mechanisms 
lead to vote unity, but are also more likely to develop in systems with vote of 
confidence procedure, where unity is more beneficial. In such systems party leaders 
are more likely to push for the development of control mechanisms and backbenchers 
are also more likely to accept them for they help avoid some collective action 
problems (Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Aldrich, 1995). Testing these predictors in a 
single regression without accounting for the possible causal relationships among 
them—as the previous literature has done it—is prone to multicolinearity, and 
implicitly non-results.  
The chapter also challenges the view that electoral rules that make candidates 
individually accountable to voters necessarily lead to more vote defections. It 
suggests that higher personal accountability decreases vote unity only if party leaders 
do not control candidate nomination. Where parties control nomination the effect of 
electoral rules is neutralized. This finding is in tone with what recent literature on 
vote unity in mixed electoral systems (see Shugart and Wattenberg, 2003): MPs 
elected in single member districts are not more likely to defect from their party 
position than those elected on party lists if party leaders control their nomination 
process (see Ferrara, 2004 on Italy, Crisp, 2007 on Venezuela). 
The second ant third chapters focus solely on the effect of electoral rules on 
MP behavior, and look at the consequences of the 2008 Romanian electoral reform. 
In 2008 Romania moved from a closed list proportional representation system to a 
!!! ^!
^!
system in which all candidates run in single member districts. The electoral reform 
was meant to make MPs more individually accountable to constituents who can now 
single them out at the polls, with consequences over their behavior inside the 
Parliament. The two chapters look at MP behavior before and after the reform.  
Chapter 2 looks at MP vote defection from the party position before and after 
the reform. It uses vote records from the Romanian Chamber of Deputies from the 
first year of the 2004-2008 term (pre-reform) and the first year of the 2008-2012 term 
(post-reform). Based on the expectations in the literature, post-reform MPs should 
defect more often from the vote position of their party than pre-reform MPs. The 
empirical tests find that because parties in Romania have kept strong leverage over 
their backbenchers, the expected effect is seen only in the less important votes in 
which party leaders allow defection. This finding emphasizes the role of party 
leadership control over nominations, and thus is in tone with the first chapter. 
Furthermore, the tests find that the MPs elected after the reform are more likely to 
engage in other activities that bring the appreciation of voters, such as proposing 
legislation or questioning the cabinet.  
Chapter 2 suggests that the reform has made MPs more active on the 
Chamber’s floor, but cannot establish whether this is a reflection of better 
representation or of mere theatre. Hence, Chapter 3 looks at whether the electoral 
reform has made MPs more accountable to their voters, and whether this is likely to 
increase the quality of representation. It does so with the help of post 2008 election 
surveys as well as in depth interviews with members of the Romanian Chamber of 
Deputies. The conclusions of the chapter paint a rather somber image of the reform. 
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Thus, while all MPs interviewed claimed that the reform has made representatives 
more accountable to their constituents, they had hard times naming specific channels 
through which representatives get legislative input from their constituents. The one 
such channel—the weekly meetings with constituents—is used for requests unrelated 
with the role of the legislator: to legislate. If anything, the new electoral law has led to 
stronger clientelistic ties between voters and representatives, and created advantages 
for candidates with high financial resources.  
Furthermore, the analysis finds that because Romania is a unitary state politics 
are framed at the national level and few issues have different implications for voters 
in different districts. This finding questions the utility of making candidates more 
identifiable at the polls, and thus fits within the debate about the normative 
consequences of individual accountability. The supporters of individual 
accountability in elections claim that it makes representatives more responsive to the 
needs of their districts and thus take more local input when legislating. However, if 
the channels of transmitting the information from voters to representatives are weak, 
and if the interests of voters do not vary significantly across regions, making MPs 
easily identifiable at the polls is futile. If anything, it may have negative 
consequences such as the development of clientelistic ties between the representative 
and her constituents.  
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 1. Institutions and Vote Unity in Parliaments: Evidence from 33 
National Chambers 
A vast literature has affirmed the relationship between institutional 
arrangements and party vote unity in national parliaments. The theoretical foundation 
for this literature is the “competing principals” paradigm, according to which the vote 
decision of an individual MP (the agent) is influenced by the wishes of voters and 
party group leaders (the principals) (Ferejohn 1999; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; 
Epstein and O’Halloran 1999). Institutional arrangements that increase the control of 
voters over their representatives decrease vote unity, while arrangements that increase 
the control of party leaders increase it (Carey 2007; Carey 2009; Sieberer 2006; 
Morgenstern 2003). Additionally, the literature has focused on arrangements that 
endow party leaders with the capacity to recruit members that share similar political 
views or to control the legislative agenda and thus filter out controversial votes (Cox 
and McCubbins, 2005; Doring, 1995; Aleman, 2006; Mattson and Strom, 1995).  
The literature on vote unity has primarily emphasized two institutional 
features: the vote of confidence procedure (Cox, 1987; Carey, 2007; Carey, 2009) and 
electoral rules (Collie 1985; Loewenberg and Patterson 1975; Haspel et al, 1998; 
Thames, 2005). This literature suffers from several shortcomings. First, while 
empirical works have found mixed results about the role of electoral rules, no 
empirical work to date has found a relationship between vote of confidence procedure 
and vote unity. Also, the literature has not provided a theoretical mechanism that 
relates the vote of confidence procedure to higher vote unity in parliaments. Based on 
the existing literature (Huber, 1996; Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998) one should 
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expect vote unity in votes of confidence, but since these are rare occurrences there is 
no reason to expect higher vote unity in other votes in systems with the procedure. 
Furthermore, the vote of confidence and electoral rules have been analyzed separately, 
and we do not know how important each one is, nor how they act in conjunction. The 
few large N tests that tested both hypotheses fell short of reaching definitive 
conclusions (see Carey 2007; Carey 2009). This chapter seeks to fill these gaps in the 
literature with the help of a large dataset of votes from 33 national parliaments. The 
purpose of the chapter is three-fold. More broadly, it seeks to confirm some of the 
theoretical expectations from the literature on vote unity. Also, with the help of the 
largest dataset of votes to date the study hopes to confirm some of the relationships 
that have been repeatedly affirmed yet never fully confirmed in the literature. One 
such relationship is the one between the vote of confidence procedure and vote unity. 
It also seeks to provide a theoretical mechanism linking the confidence procedure to 
vote unity. Finally, the study strives for more definitive answers about the importance 
of each of the two institutional arrangements emphasized in the literature—the vote of 
confidence and electoral rules—as well as the ways in which they may interact.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: the next section introduces some theoretical 
expectations about the effect of institutions on vote unity. The following two sections 
describe the data and present the results of the tests and their interpretation. The 
chapter concludes by summarizing the consequences of institutions for vote unity. 
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1.1 Institutions and Vote Unity: Hypotheses  
Vote unity in parliaments has been conceptualized as the result of (1) the extent 
to which MPs feel responsive to their party leaders or their voters, (2) the ideological 
unity of party members, (3) the capacity of party leaders to influence which votes make 
it to the floor.  
The competing principals paradigm—originated in the literature on US 
Congress—has been at the origin of most studies on vote unity. Simply put, when 
voting on the floor an individual member of Congress acts as an agent with two 
principals: her party group in Congress and her constituency. The vote decision of an 
individual member is thus the consequence of: a) her ideal position on the issue, b) the 
position of her party and c) that of her constituency (Ferejohn, 1999; McCubbins and 
Schwartz 1984; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999). This framework has been successfully 
applied to studies of vote behavior in the European Parliament (Hix, Noury, and 
Roland 2007), as well as multi-country comparative studies (Carey 2007; Carey 2009). 
Institutions influence how much each of the two principals influence the agent, 
with consequences over the degree of party vote unity in parliament. To the extent that 
they increase the capacity of leaders at the expense of constituents, these institutions 
lead to vote unity. Among the institutions influencing the control of the principals, 
electoral rules have been the most emphasized. Electoral rules influence the extent to 
which MPs feel responsive to voters or party leaders, which in turn influences the 
MPs’ vote behavior (Thames 2001; Haspel et al 1998; Collie 1985; Loewenberg and 
Patterson 1975; Weaver and Rockman 1993; Hix 2004; Thames 2005). The competing 
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principals literature has also emphasized the role of sticks and carrots at the hands of 
party leaders that give them an edge in the struggle to control the agent, such as 
control over leadership positions inside the party or the legislature, pork barrel 
spending, campaign support, expulsion from the party etc (see Cox and McCubbins 
1993; Bowler, Farrell and Katz 1999).  
Vote unity has also been understood as the result of ideological cohesion of 
party members. A party is more likely to show a high degree of unity if its members 
share similar ideological views, which should translate in similar policy and vote 
preferences (Ozbudun 1970). Krehbiel (2000) suggests that party vote unity in the US 
House of Representatives is more likely to be determined by representatives’ 
preferences than party discipline. Similarly, Snyder and Groseclose (2000) find that 
individual vote behavior is the result of both individual preferences and party 
discipline. Some institutional arrangements endow party leaders with the capacity to 
recruit the “right” type of backbenchers who share their ideological views and 
implicitly their policy preferences. The party group membership in the parliament can 
be influenced through the selection of candidates in legislative elections, but also 
through strategies of recruiting party members and leaders at local or national levels 
(see Jones and Hwang, 2005).  
Finally, the literature has focused on filtering mechanisms that allow party 
leaders to keep unwanted votes away from the floor. In the context of the US Congress 
the literature has focused on the agenda setting capacity of party coalitions  (Cox and 
McCubbins 2005). In the European and Latin American contexts, the literature has 
emphasized the role of parliamentary institutions in charge with setting the daily 
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agenda (see Doring 1995; Aleman 2006), restrictions on individual members’ 
initiatives, or the capacity of committees to prevent bills from reaching the floor 
(Mattson and Strom 1995; Doring 2001). 
The scholarly literature on vote unity in parliaments has emphasized the 
distinction between parliamentary and presidential systems, and the distinction between 
plurality and proportional representation (PR) systems of elections. The classic divide 
is between the PR /parliamentary systems of continental Europe and the 
plurality/presidential system of the United States. In a closed list PR electoral system 
voters cannot single out individual candidates, which in turn makes elected officials 
less responsive to voters; also, in most PR systems control over the candidate list gives 
party leaders extra leverage over their backbenchers (Collie 1985; Loewenberg and 
Patterson 1975; Weaver and Rockman 1993). On top of these, the vote of confidence 
procedure of the parliamentary systems allows party leaders more control over their 
backbenchers (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Huber 
1996). These political arrangements account for the proverbial party discipline of 
European democracies. At the opposite spectrum, American plurality elections induce 
Congressmen to be individually responsive to their voters while the presidential 
system eliminates the fear of losing a vote of confidence and thus makes the whipping 
efforts of party leaders more difficult. Hence, the higher floor independence of 
American Congressmen. 
While the parliamentary/presidential and closed list PR/ plurality distinctions 
have remained the norm in undergraduate comparative politics textbooks, the more 
recent scholarly literature has delved more deeply into the mechanisms through which 
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these institutional arrangements influence vote unity. This is especially true of 
electoral rules, and is a consequence of the fact that with the advent of mixed systems 
few countries still fall within the PR vs plurality pattern (see Shugart and Wattenberg 
2003). 
The main characteristic of parliamentary systems considered in the literature is 
the vote of confidence procedure. Backbenchers in systems with vote of confidence 
procedures are expected to toe the party line because failing to pass a vote of 
confidence can have tremendous costs, namely the dissolution of the parliament and 
calling of new elections (Huber, 1996; Diermeier and Fedderson 1998). Based on this 
account the vote of confidence increases the control of party leaders over 
backbenchers and thus fits the competing principals paradigm. The threat of new 
elections however, is not present in most votes, for votes of confidence are rare 
occurrences. Why should one expect overall higher levels of unity in parliamentary 
systems than in presidential ones? MPs may be more united in votes of confidence, but 
since these are such rare occurrences, the effect over the average unity in all votes 
should be negligible.  
There are two indirect ways in which the existence of the confidence procedure 
may influence unity in non-confidence votes. First, one can expect that the threat of 
losing a vote of confidence may lead to the development of control mechanisms in the 
hands of party leaders to help them avoid party dissent when faced with a confidence 
vote. Previous works grounded in distribution theory have shown that parliamentary 
institutional reforms take place when they are beneficial to a part of MPs who form a 
minimum winning coalition (see Longley and Hoffman 1999; also Cox 1987). MPs 
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work within the confines of institutional arrangements, but they are also the agents of 
institutional change. Party leaders in systems with vote of confidence procedure are 
more likely to push for the development of mechanisms of control, for their use brings 
higher benefits. Backbenchers are also more likely to accept these control mechanisms 
for they help avoid some collective action problems1. Hence, we can expect more 
mechanisms that empower party leaders to be present in countries with vote of 
confidence procedure. The procedure increases the benefits of vote unity, which in 
turn makes the creation of leadership control mechanisms beneficial to a large number 
of MPs and thus facilitates the formation of minimum winning coalitions necessary for 
reform. 
Second, the high costs associated with the loss of a vote of confidence may 
influence the recruitment strategies of party leaders. Although the confidence 
procedure is rarely invoked, the fact that losing one is extremely costly may convince 
leaders to recruit backbenchers that share their ideological inclinations and thus 
minimize the probability of policy disagreements when faced with a vote of 
confidence. This in turn should translate into higher vote unity in all votes. The 
existence of the confidence procedure may lead to the development of institutional 
arrangements that endow leaders with control over the recruitment of members, and 
push leaders into using these mechanisms to recruit members with similar ideological !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 In a given vote the rank and file is facing a collective action problem. Let us imagine 
the situation in which an individual member would like to see the policy endorsed by 
her party pass, because a negative vote leads to the demise of the government and the 
calling of new elections. This policy however, is not popular in her constituency. The 
MP may vote against it, hoping that her vote will not influence the final outcome. 
However, if a certain number of MPs think this way, the policy does not pass, and the 
outcome is costly for all of them (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Aldrich 1995).  
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views. This argument is not related to the competing principals theory but to the cartel 
theory (see Cox and McCubbins, 1993).  
Given these expectations I hypothesize that: 
H1: Vote unity in systems with vote of confidence procedure is higher than in 
those without the procedure. 
The vote of confidence procedure may not be the only mechanism through 
which the parliamentary/presidential distinction is relevant. Publicly elected presidents 
can influence the vote behavior of members of parliament because they possess the 
capacity to reward or punish backbencher behavior (Linz 1994; Calvo 2007; Carey 
2009).  Therefore, party leaders in presidential systems have to counteract a third 
principal. To the extent that the president and party leaders have contradicting views, 
this should translate into lower vote unity. Carey (2009) finds that this problem is 
more acute for leaders of the president’s party. In parliamentary systems where 
executive and legislative powers are fused, government parties should have more 
resources to discipline their members. Hence, one can expect higher vote unity. In 
presidential systems the resources are split with the president. Carey (2009) finds that 
because of this, unity in government parties is higher in parliamentary than in 
presidential systems. To sum up,  
H2: Vote unity should be lower in systems with popularly elected presidents 
than in parliamentary systems. 
H2a: Vote unity should be higher for parties in government in parliamentary 
systems than in presidential systems.  
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While the relationship between vote of confidence and vote unity has been 
repeatedly affirmed, no empirical test to date has validated it. The paucity of vote data 
from national parliaments has made it difficult for the few cross-national studies to 
reach definitive conclusions. Also, the few large N studies have not been able to 
separate the two mechanisms noted above (see Sieberer 2006; Carey 2007; Carey 
2009). Because countries with elected presidents also tend to lack vote of confidence 
procedure, it is difficult to test these two hypotheses in a single regression without 
running into multicolinearity. As Carey (2009) notes, in order for these two effects to 
be discerned one needs vote data from hybrid regimes that combine publicly elected 
presidents with vote of confidence procedures. This study tries to tackle both problems 
with the help of the largest database of votes to date from 33 different parliaments, of 
which 5 are hybrid regimes. 
The literature on party unity has extensively focused on the role played by 
electoral rules (Collie 1985; Loewenberg and Patterson 1975; Weaver and Rockman 
1993; Hix 2004; Haspel et al 1998; Thames 2005). The more recent literature has 
departed from the PR vs. plurality dichotomy and has focused instead on a wide range 
of mechanisms that encourage personal or collective accountability by candidates for 
office. In a nutshell, electoral systems that encourage personal accountability are 
systems in which candidates for office improve their chances of election if they 
develop personal reputations outside of their parties’ reputations (see Depauw and 
Martin 2009). This literature looks at characteristics of systems such as district size, 
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vote pooling, ballot control or number of votes cast by each voter2 (Carey and Shugart 
1995; Wallack et al 2003; Hallerberg and Marier 2004).  
The influence of electoral rules on vote unity has been extensively tested in 
studies of mixed member systems of elections which elect part of their MPs in single 
member districts and part on lists. The expectation is that MPs elected in single 
member districts be more responsive to their constituents and therefore vote more 
independently than their list colleagues. The tests to date however, have shown mixed 
results. Thus, while Thames (2001) finds a significant effect of mode of election on 
vote defection in the Russian Duma, Haspel et al (1998) find no such effect. 
Subsequent studies of mixed member-systems have found little or no connection 
between mode of election and vote behavior. This lack of results has been explained 
through the connections between the MPs elected through the two electoral tiers 
(contamination effect), as well as the capacity of party leaders to induce MPs to stick 
to the party line and thus counteract the possible effect of increased responsibility to 
voters (Bawn and Thies 2003; Ferrara 2004; Thames 2005; Crisp 2007).  
 Recent cross-national studies (Carey 2007, 2009) have found that parties in 
systems where candidates compete against other members of their own party in 
elections are more prone to disunity. Studies of vote behavior in the European 
Parliament have found that members of European Parliament elected in systems that 
empower the leaders of their national party are more likely to defect from the vote 
position of their European party group and to side with their national group (Hix 2004; 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 For a detailed description of these four mechanisms see Carey and Shugart (1995). 
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Coman 2009). Following the expectations from the existing literature I hypothesize 
that: 
H3: Vote unity should be lower in electoral systems that encourage MP 
individual accountability than in systems that encourage party accountability. 
This expectation has been the norm in the literature and rests on the 
assumption that electoral systems in which candidates can be singled out more easily 
always give an edge to voters over party leaders in their struggle to control the agent. 
Hence one should always expect more vote defections in such systems. This 
assumption is certainly true in systems where the candidate selection process is not 
influenced by party leaders. The United States is one such case. The mixed member 
systems literature has shown however that in countries where party leaders control the 
selection process the voter advantage is neutralized. For instance, Crisp (2007) 
suggests that the capacity of Venezuelan party leaders to control the selection of 
candidates neutralizes the incentives for personal votes of the MPs elected in single 
member districts. Similarly, Thames (2005) finds that in the countries with strong 
party institutionalization of Eastern Europe party leaders are able to overcome the 
pressures for vote independence from MPs elected in single member districts. Control 
over nomination gives party leaders an important stick to control MPs who are 
concerned about finding themselves in electable positions in upcoming elections, but 
also allows leaders to filter candidates and select those that are more likely to share 
their views and thus to toe the party line once in parliament (see Krehbiel 2000). Both 
of these mechanisms are likely to increase vote unity. 
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 If anything, electoral systems that make candidates individually accountable 
may give an advantage to party leaders who control nomination for they now posses a 
more valuable tool: control over the nomination in a single member district as opposed 
to control over a long list of names. Just as voters can single out candidates more 
easily, so do party leaders3. Furthermore, previous literature has shown that MP vote 
behavior is more important for party leaders than for constituents. Voters are less 
aware of the voting records of their representatives, and political leaders have an 
information advantage (Ferejohn 1999). If both principals increase their control over 
the agent, yet vote behavior is more important for party leaders, one can expect higher 
vote unity. This expectation is confirmed by Ferrara (2004), who finds that because of 
strong leadership control over nomination in the mixed member Italian system, MPs 
elected in single member districts are more likely to toe the party line than those 
elected on lists. To sum up: 
H3a: Electoral rules that increase candidate personal accountability are likely 
to decrease unity in parties whose candidate nomination is not controlled by leaders; 
where nominations are controlled by leaders, the effect of personal accountability 
should be neutralized.  
Previous works on discipline inside parliaments have confirmed the 
importance of sticks and carrots that endow leaders with control over backbenchers 
such as leadership positions inside the party or the legislature, pork barrel spending, 
campaign support, expulsion from the party etc (see Cox and McCubbins 1993; 
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3 This is obviously not true about open list PR systems, which are usually associated 
with high individual accountability.  
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Bowler, Farrell and Katz 1999). While the literature has emphasized a wide range of 
mechanisms through which party leaders can exercise control over backbenchers, here 
I look at one such source of leadership control: government involvement in campaign 
finance. The literature on campaign spending has shown that reliance on government 
funds for electoral campaigns increases party centralization, for in most cases party 
leaders control the distribution of funds (Fisher and Eisenstadt 2004). On the other 
hand, candidates who rely on private donors for campaign money are more likely to 
pursue the interests of these donors— voters or businesses— and thus to diverge from 
their party’s position more often.4 Control over campaign funds also gives leaders 
control over the party political message emphasized in the campaign, and thus allow 
them to keep controversial issues out of the party agenda. This in turn is likely to build 
a more cohesive block of representatives to the parliament. In conclusion, 
H4: Vote unity should be higher in systems in which MPs rely on government 
funds than in systems in which they rely on private donors in electoral campaigns. 
1.2 Data  
The empirical tests use vote data from 33 different national parliamentary 
chambers.  The tests include the roll call votes from 16 of the 19 parliaments analyzed 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The choice of testing only one of the many mechanisms at the hand of party leaders 
is dictated by the availability of data. Gathering information from a wide range of 
countries about the many possible mechanisms that could be considered is a difficult 
endeavor, especially since these mechanisms are difficult to quantify. Also, the goal of 
the study is not to test an exhaustive list of mechanisms through which party leaders 
control backbencher behavior, but more generally to illustrate the causal relationship 
between the vote of confidence procedure and the development of control mechanisms 
as well as their effect on vote unity.  
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in Carey (2007) and Carey (2009) and add votes from 17 new parliaments5. Since vote 
results are still difficult to get in many countries, the criterion for the inclusion of the 
17 new parliaments was the availability of data. Table 1.1 depicts the vote data by 
country together with descriptive statistics for all country level variables.  
<Table 1.1 around here> 
The dependent variable looks at the degree of vote unity in each party 
measured as adjusted weighted rice index. This measurement is obtained in three 
steps. First, I compute Rice indexes for each party in each vote based on the widely 
accepted formula developed by Rice (1925). These scores are then averaged based on 
a formula developed by Carey (2007; 2009) that gives more weight to contested votes. 
Furthermore, the final scores are adjusted for small party bias (see Desposato 2005) 
based on the formula used in Carey (2009) (see Appendix 1 for details).6 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The use of votes from Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Russia is problematic for in these 
countries votes are passed with majorities of all MPs in the legislature, regardless of 
how many are present at the time of the vote. This means that a nonvote (absence) has 
the same effect as a negative vote, which makes it difficult to interpret its meaning. It 
is possible that a MP who misses a vote does so because she wants to cast a negative 
vote. But she may also be absent for other reasons, unrelated to the particular vote (see 
Carey 2009, 97). In the three countries, treating nonvotes as nay votes is likely to 
underestimate the index of unity, while treating them as absences is likely to 
overestimate the index. To avoid such problems I do not include the three countries in 
the analysis.  
[!I also used an additional measurement for the dependent variable, the degree of party 
unity. This measurement adds  (1) the number of times a party got stuffed, that is it 
lost a vote although it could have won it had all its members taken the vote position 
taken by a plurality of party members to the number of times the party; (2) the number 
of times a party got rolled, that is it could have prevented the passing of a vote had it 
voted together. This additional measure is meant to account for the role of coalitions in 
determining the overall degree of unity. All tests in Table 1.3 are replicated using this 
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The operationalizations of the independent variables are presented in Table 
1.27. 
Some of the variables need further explanation. To measure whether the 
electoral system encourages individual or collective accountability I use an index 
developed by Hallerberg and Marier (2004). The index is based on the four 
mechanisms through which electoral rules encourage the development of individual or 
party accountability according to Carey and Shugart (1995) (see Appendix 1). The 
index runs from “0,” for a system that fully encourages party accountability to “1,” for 
a system that fully encourages personal accountability. Candidate selection is a 
dummy variable that differentiates between parties that allow central leadership to 
control the selection of candidates for office (“1”) and those that do not (“0”). 
Selection is controlled in systems in which leaders influence the list of candidates 
directly and in systems in which local organizations determine the candidates, yet the 
central organization approves the final list. In all other cases candidate selection is 
considered not controlled by leaders8. 
 
<Table 1.2 around here> 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
additional measurement of unity. The results reported in Tables A1 and A3 of the 
Appendix show similar results to those reported in Table 1.3.!
7 The operationalizations together with the sources used are detailed in the 
Appendixes.  
8As the basis of this variable I use the six-point categorization used by Bille (2001) to 
characterize nomination control in Western democracies. Categories 1 to 4 in Bille 
(2001) are recoded as “controlled by leadership” (score of “1”) and categories 5-6 as 
“locally controlled nominations” (score of “0”). 
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 The models also include a series of control variables, which I present below 
together with theoretical expectations about them.  
Politics in federal systems are more locally organized, which leads to many 
different voices inside parties, with consequences over their ideological cohesiveness. 
This should translate into lower vote unity. The effective number of parties is 
computed based on the formula developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). The 
expectation is that parties in fragmented systems be more cohesive ideologically for 
they occupy smaller ideological spaces. This should translate into higher rice indexes. 
The age of regime is expected to be positively correlated with party unity. Parties 
should be better organized and more ideologically homogenous in better established 
democracies than in new ones (see Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Thames 2005). Vote 
frequency is measured as the number of votes per month and is meant to partially 
control for the fact that the parliaments analyzed have different rules for calling votes. 
Some parliaments publish all votes, some only specific votes, and others only 
requested roll call votes (Hug 2010; Carrubba and Gabel, 1999; Carrubba et al, 2006). 
The literature has not established the effect—if any—that the rules for calling a vote 
have on vote unity. If roll call votes are called by party leaders on controversial issues 
one can expect lower unity in these votes. If, on the other hand, votes are called 
exactly to control backbenchers, then one can expect higher unity (Sieberer 2006). The 
frequency of votes is used here as a proxy for how easy it is to call a vote, with low 
frequencies meaning higher difficulty to call votes9. Finally, the analyses consider the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Additionally all the statistical tests in Table 1.3 are replicated using a small number 
of parliaments that report vote results with high frequency. As a cutpoint, these 
analyses include only parliaments that record at least 25 votes per month. This reduces 
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share of seats held by the party in the parliament. Based on existing literature, two 
different expectations can be derived (Carey 2009, 149). If one thinks of larger parties 
as political units that display higher ideological variance, then one should expect them 
to be less unified in votes. If, on the other hand, one considers the fact that leaders of 
larger parties have more access to resources to reward backbenchers’ behavior, then 
one should expect higher vote unity.  
1.3 Models and Results 
Table 1.3 presents the results of the statistical analyses. To account for the fact 
that the predictors are at two levels of aggregation (system and party level), I use a 
random effects GLS model written as: 
 
where 
 
S 1  to S10  refer to system variables and P1-P2 to party level variables. 
Subscript i   differentiates among parties and subscript j among countries.  
<Table 1.3 around here> 
Table 1.3 presents the results of 9 different models. Models 1 to 4 test the 
effect of electoral rules on vote unity. The results in Model 1 find no relationship !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the sample to 19 parliaments. The results based on the small sample reported in Tables 
A2 and A3 of the Appendix are similar to those based on the full sample, regardless of 
the way in which we measure unity.  
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between personal accountability in elections and vote unity in parliaments, which is 
counter to what the previous literature has claimed. Hence, Models 2 to 4 test the 
alternative hypothesis H3a. Based on H3a the effect of electoral rules should be 
contingent on how involved party leaders are in the process of candidate nomination. 
Electoral systems that make candidates more accountable to voters should decrease 
party unity only if party leaders do not control the nomination process. The analyses in 
Models 2 to 4 find a significant interactive effect between individual accountability 
and candidate selection. 
 As Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006, 73) point out, in order to fully 
understand the effects of interactive terms, one needs to calculate substantively 
meaningful marginal effects and standard errors. To this end Table 1.4 details the 
effect of individual accountability in vote unity for parties with leadership controlled 
candidate selection and for parties without it. The coefficients in Table 1.4 show that 
for parties in which leaders do not control candidate selection, personal accountability 
decreases vote unity. Moving from the minimum to the maximum value of the 
Hallerberg and Marrier index, decreases vote unity by .21, roughly one standard 
deviation. This effect is significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficients in Table 1.4 also 
suggest an opposite effect of accountability on unity for parties whose leaders control 
candidate selection. This effect however, falls short of statistical significance (t-value 
of 1.57).  
The effect of personal accountability is strongly reduced in Model 4 when I 
control for whether the parties come from systems with vote of confidence procedure, 
the predictor that is significant in all models in which is included. As a consequence, 
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the marginal effects of personal accountability for both parties with and without 
leadership-controlled nominations become statistically insignificant.  
<Table 1.4 around here> 
Models 5 and 6 test the effect of government involvement in campaign 
funding. We associated higher government involvement with higher leadership control 
over backbenchers as well as control over their parties’ political platforms and 
implicitly higher vote unity. The results in Model 1.5 support this hypothesis. Higher 
levels of campaign subsidies as proportions of total campaign expenditures are 
associated with higher levels of party vote unity. The effect is significant in the 
presence of controls but, similarly to the effect of personal accountability, it turns 
insignificant when I control for the vote of confidence procedure in Model 6. 
The vote of confidence procedure emerges as the most important explanans of 
vote unity. The relationship between vote of confidence and vote unity remains 
significant throughout all models in which this predictor is included. In substantive 
terms this relationship is very strong. Thus, based on the results from Model 9 (full 
model), moving from a system without the confidence procedure to one with the 
procedure increases the average rice index by .13, roughly one half of a standard 
deviation. 
The fact that the effects of both personal accountability and government 
subsidies for electoral campaigns decrease considerably when we control for the 
existence of vote of confidence procedure seem to support our expectations about the 
relationship between the vote of confidence procedure and the development of 
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mechanisms of backbencher control. Control over nomination of candidates gives 
leaders an important control tool over backbenchers who know that leaders may 
punish vote dissent when selecting candidates for future elections, but also allows 
leaders to select candidates with similar ideological convictions who are less likely to 
defect. The same is true of campaign subsidies.  
With the data at hand I tested the causal relationships between vote of 
confidence and government involvement in campaign finance as well as between vote 
of confidence and leadership control over candidate selection. The tests reported in 
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 show that after controlling for the other explanations considered in 
the literature (see Lundell, 2004; Nassmacher, 2009; Koß, 2011) the vote of 
confidence procedure is a significant predictor of both government campaign subsidies 
and leadership control over candidate selection. These relationships explain some of 
the results in Table 1.3 and are in accord with our expectations about the indirect 
effect of the confidence procedure on vote unity through the development of sticks and 
carrots as well as selection of party representatives to parliament. The development of 
mechanisms of control is a time-laden process, and therefore the cross-sectional tests 
in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 are not definitive. Future research should model the relationship 
between vote of confidence procedure and the development of control mechanisms 
across time. 
The analysis reported in Table 1.7 tests the relationship between the 
confidence procedure and party ideological disunity. If confidence procedure 
influences vote unity through the selection of party representatives that are 
ideologically similar, then parties in systems without the procedure should be less 
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cohesive ideologically. To tap the ideological disunity of each party in the dataset I 
use a proxy that measures the ideological cohesion of their supporters as reflected in 
public opinion surveys. One can expect parties to attract supporters with a wide range 
of ideological beliefs when they have candidates running for office with a wide range 
of ideological beliefs. The supporters of a party are all respondents who declare that 
particular party as their vote preference. The list of surveys used can be found in the 
Appendix 3. To compute the ideological cohesion of party supporters I look at a 
survey question that asks respondents to place themselves on an 11-point left-right 
ideological scale, and compute the standard deviation of their placement. Higher 
standard deviation represents more ideological disunity. The results in Table 1.7, 
Model 1 support our expectation about the causal relationship between the confidence 
procedure and ideological cohesion: parties are more ideologically cohesive in 
systems with vote of confidence procedure. 
<Tables 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7 around here> 
Models 7 and 8 in Table 1.3 test whether the existence of presidents as third 
principals affect in any way vote unity. The two tests fail to confirm an effect of 
presidentialism on vote unity. The test in Model 9 also fails to confirm the interactive 
effect found by Carey (2009) between presidentialism and government party (H2a).  
Among the control variables considered here, only the party seat share shows a 
significant effect on vote unity. The tests find that larger parties are more united in 
votes, suggesting that better access to resources give the leaders of large parties an 
important advantage in their struggle to control the agent. This relationship is 
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significant in all models in which is included. None of the other control variables has a 
significant effect on vote unity. Thus, in accord with what Carey  (2006; 2009) has 
found, parties in federal systems are not less united than parties in unitary systems. 
Also, party fragmentation does not make parties more united ideologically. At least 
this is not reflected in higher vote unity. Furthermore, the tests do not find a significant 
relationship between the age of the democratic establishment and party vote unity. 
Finally, I do not find a relationship between the frequency with which votes are 
recorded in parliaments and party rice indexes. These results are quite similar across 
the models in which these controls are included. 
1.4 Concluding Remarks  
This study tests the relationship between institutions and party vote unity in 
national parliaments with the help of the largest dataset of votes to date.  
The paper brings two theoretical contributions. First, it provides an explanation 
for why one should expect high vote unity in political systems with vote of confidence 
procedure although the procedure is rarely invoked. The costs associated with losing a 
vote of confidence lead to the development of stronger backbencher control 
mechanisms, as well as the recruitment of members with similar political views. The 
leaders’ control over the selection of candidates in elections increases their control 
over backbenchers in the parliament, but this selection control is more likely to 
develop in countries where there is a vote of confidence procedure and implicitly 
higher need for vote unity. The same is true of the development of government 
involvement in campaign finance. This finding has implications for large N tests of 
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vote unity that use both types of institutions, for their use in the same regression is 
problematic due to multicollinearity. This may partially explain the dearth of 
definitive findings in the existing large N literature. Similarly, parties in systems with 
vote of confidence procedure have members with similar ideological inclinations, 
which is likely to be a function of recruiting efforts by the party leaders. 
Second, the study challenges a rather established view that electoral rules that 
make candidates individually accountable to voters necessarily lead to vote 
independence. The results presented here suggest that the effect of individual 
accountability is contingent on the extent to which party leaders control the selection 
of candidates for office. Higher electoral accountability translates into higher party 
unity only when leaders do not control the candidate nomination process. This is 
because control over single member district nomination gives them more power in 
relationship with backbenchers than control over a multi-member list.  
The main empirical contribution of the paper is the unequivocal confirmation 
of the relationship between vote of confidence procedure and vote unity. Parties in 
systems with confidence procedure are more united, a statement strongly supported by 
the statistical models. This relationship is highly significant, and accounts for most of 
the variance in the dependent variable. While the previous literature has emphasized 
the role of both electoral rules and the vote of confidence procedure, it has not found 
definitive answers about which of the two factors is more important. This study finds 
that it is the vote of confidence procedure.
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2. Legislative Behavior under High Constituency and Party Leadership 
Control: The Effect of the 2008 Romanian Electoral Reform 
 
2.1 Introduction 
A vast scholarly literature has been concerned with the effect of institutions on 
the responsiveness of members of parliament (MPs) to citizens and party leaders.  
Special attention has been given to electoral rules and the degree to which they push 
candidates in legislative elections into developing personal or party centered campaigns 
(Carey and Shugart 1995; Ames 1995; Golden and Chang 2001; Samuels 1999; 
Hallerberg and Marier 2004). This in turn, has direct implications on the degree of 
party unity inside legislatures. MPs in systems that encourage personal votes are more 
likely to diverge from the official vote position of their party than MPs elected in party-
centered systems (Carey 2007; Carey 2009; Hix 2004). 
This paper challenges some of the assertions in the existing literature by 
emphasizing the role of party leadership in mediating the effect of electoral institutions. 
While certain electoral arrangements make MPs more responsive to their voters, their 
effect on vote behavior inside legislatures is strongly influenced by party leaders’ 
capacity to counteract the pressures for MP vote independence.  
These findings are based on a series of tests of the effect of the 2008 Romanian 
electoral reform on the behavior of members of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies. 
The reform moved Romania from a closed list proportional representation electoral 
system to a system in which all candidates run in single member districts.  Based on the
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existing literature the shift should push MPs towards more personal reputation building, 
with consequences over their degree of vote independence. The empirical tests run here 
compare MP behavior before the reform with MP behavior after the reform, and the 
findings correct some of the assumptions about the relationship between electoral rules 
and MP behavior. 
The empirical tests underline the role of party leadership control over MPs in 
mediating the effect of the electoral reform on the behavior of MPs. Because parties in 
Romania have kept strong leverage over their backbenchers, the expected effect of the 
electoral reform is seen only in the less important votes in which party leaders allow 
defection. Furthermore, the tests find that the MPs elected after the reform are more 
likely to engage in other activities that bring the appreciation of voters, such as 
proposing legislation or questioning the cabinet. Party leaders are more likely to allow 
such activities, which are less damaging than vote defection.   
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical work on 
the connection between electoral rules and the development of party or constituency 
allegiances by legislators, together with some of the empirical findings in the literature. 
Section three describes the 2008 Romanian reform and based on the theoretical 
lens exposed in section two, it hypothesizes about the implications of the reform on MP 
behavior. Section four tests the theoretical implications with data from the last two 
terms of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies (Lower House). The paper ends with 
concluding remarks about the effect of electoral rules on vote behavior inside 
legislatures. 
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2.2 Empowering Voters or Parties through Electoral Rules 
This paper assesses the vote behavior of individual members of a national 
parliament within the principal-agent framework employed in the literature on vote 
behavior in legislatures.  
Previous research has shown that candidates may benefit from having a 
reputation that departs from that of their party and that the incentive for this is 
influenced by electoral rules (Carey and Shugart 1995; Ames 1995; Golden and Chang 
2001; Samuels 1999; Hallerberg and Marier 2004). Whether MPs feel they need to 
satisfy their voters or their party leaders influences their behavior inside the legislature. 
MPs in electoral systems that encourage personal reputation are more likely to account 
for their constituencies’ wishes when voting on the floor of the legislature, and thus to 
defect from the vote position of their party (Carey 2007; Carey 2009; Hix 2004). 
Taking into account the wishes of the constituency when voting in the parliament is 
only one of many ways in which a MP can improve the way she fares with voters. 
Inside the legislature, responsive MPs also try to catch the media limelight. They do so 
through speeches, legislative initiation (in parliaments which allow them to do so), 
government questioning etc. Outside the parliament, MPs take trips to their districts 
where they participate in local activities that get media attention, organize events, hold 
press conferences, meet with constituents etc. (Fenno 1978; Norton 1999; Crisp 2007). 
While the relationship between electoral rules and the development of party or 
personal reputations had been previously affirmed, Carey and Shugart (1995) were the 
first to develop a systematic method to account for this relationship. Carey and Shugart 
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(1995) classify electoral systems based on scores on four variables 
representing/summarizing mechanisms through which electoral rules push candidates 
into building personal or party reputations.  Ballot control accounts for the degree to 
which party leaders or voters control ballots. In systems where party leaders have a 
strong grip on the candidate selection process, candidates are less likely to cultivate a 
personal reputation, whereas the opposite holds in systems where candidate selection 
process is in the hands of voters.  Vote pooling taps whether votes cast for one 
candidate contribute to the number of seats the party receives in the district. If a 
candidate’s chances of election depend on the party’s ability to attract votes in the 
district, she feels more need for party reputation as opposed to personal reputation; the 
less dependent a candidate is on the fortunes of her party for election, the more likely 
she is to run a personal campaign. Vote accounts for whether the system allows the 
voter to cast a single vote for a party, multiple votes for candidates, or a single vote for 
a candidate. Systems that emphasize voting for the party lead to the development of 
party reputations, while systems in which the vote singles out candidates lead to the 
development of personal reputations10.    
Finally, Carey and Shugart (1995) consider the role of district size, which is 
contingent on the value of variable ballot. If party leaders control ballot nomination, 
larger districts decrease the value of personal reputation. If voters control the ballot, 
large districts make personal reputation more beneficial for candidates. The 
methodology developed by Carey and Shugart (1995) was later used by Wallack et al !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Carey and Shugart (1995) use a three point ordinal scale to code electoral systems on 
each of the three variables, with a score of “0” signifying incentives for party centered 
campaigns, and a score of “2” signifying incentives for personal campaigns. A score of 
“1” represents some intermediate category on each of the three variables. 
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(2003) and Hallerberg and Marier (2004). 
The empirical tests of the relationship between incentives to run personal or 
party centered campaigns and vote unity in parliaments have shown mixed results. 
Thus, Hix (2004) finds a relationship between vote defection in the European 
Parliament and the way in which the members are elected in their countries. Sieberer 
(2006) on the other hand, finds inconclusive support for the relationship between 
incentives to cultivate a personal vote and party unity. In more recent works Carey 
(2007; 2009) finds that the degree of vote unity in national parliaments is influenced by 
the level of intra-party electoral competition. Party vote unity is lower in systems in 
which candidates compete with other members of their own party for personal votes. 
A separate category of empirical tests involved legislative behavior in mixed-
member (MM) systems (see Shugart and Wattenberg 2003). Most MM systems have 
some of their MPs elected in single member districts and some on proportional list, a 
situation that allows the researcher to test the effect of electoral rules on vote discipline 
in a controlled environment. MPs elected in single member districts should be more 
inclined to pursue personal reputations than the MPs elected through party lists, and 
thus to defect from the vote position of their party more often. Empirical tests of MM 
systems have also produced inconsistent results (see Thames 2001; Haspel et al 1998; 
Herron 2002).  
The more recent empirical tests have departed from an extreme vision of the 
“best of both worlds” paradigm in which MPs elected on party lists should behave as 
those elected in PR closed list systems and the MPs elected in single member districts 
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should act as those elected in plurality systems.  Instead they consider the role played 
by parties and the way in which they can influence vote unity irrespective of the 
electoral rules through which MPs are elected (Crisp 2007; Ferrara 2004; Thames 
2005). The findings of these tests point out two aspects of theoretical relevance to the 
Romanian case. 
First, the findings point to the difficulty of creating an additive index based on 
the variables proposed by Carey and Shugart (1995). Carey and Shugart (1995) 
describe four mechanisms through which electoral systems influence the development 
of personal or party oriented campaigns, but it is difficult to appreciate how the four 
mechanisms interact with each other. Based on the empirical works, the party 
leadership’s capacity to control backbenchers through the ballot, as well as other 
mechanisms, acts as a game changer influencing the degree to which the other 
mechanisms identified by Carey and Shugart (1995) make a difference. For instance, 
Crisp (2007) suggests that the capacity of Venezuelan party organizations to control the 
ballot neutralizes the incentives for personal votes created by other aspects of the 
electoral system. Similarly, Ferrara (2004) finds that in Italy the role of party leaders in 
the selection of candidates is strong enough to topple the effect of the need for personal 
campaigning for the deputies elected in single member districts. In the mixed systems 
with little party institutionalization analyzed by Thames (2005), the candidates elected 
on party lists should be more likely to seek personal votes than those elected in single 
member districts. However, because the parties are not strong enough to exert their 
potential influence, the expected pattern does not emerge.  
Second, the findings of the MM literature suggest that on top of the capacities 
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given to them by electoral rules, parties have additional characteristics that influence 
their level of control of the ballot (see Depauw and Martin 2009; Shomer 2009). 
Because of these additional characteristics, parties in some mixed systems have more 
control than in other mixed systems despite similar incentives provided by the electoral 
rules. The literature on candidate selection has shown that parties from countries with 
similar electoral systems may have different degrees of party leadership involvement in 
the candidate selection process (Bille 2001; Lundell 2004). For instance, the candidate 
selection process in the United States is much less controlled by party leaders than the 
candidate selection in Westminster democracies, despite the similar electoral systems. 
There is variation in the level of selection control even among parties inside the same 
political system (Bille 2001; Lundell 2004). Thus, while electoral rules do impact the 
degree of party control over the ballot, they only tell part of the story. Other party 
features with little or no connection to the electoral system may be at play. 
When deriving theoretical expectations about the effect of the Romanian 
electoral reform one needs to pay special attention to the capacity of parties to control 
their members and the way in which this capacity influences the development of a 
personal connection between MPs and voters. Party capacity is judged based not only 
on the degree of ballot control but also on other mechanisms that have been recognized 
in the literature. 
The next section gives a brief presentation of the new electoral rules. The 
possible effects on the behavior of MPs are then analyzed within the framework 
proposed by Carey and Shugart (1995). To sum up the findings, the new electoral rules 
made candidates more likely to develop a personal vote, but at the same time, the 
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influence of party leaders over party members has remained strong. When deriving 
expectations about the effect of the electoral reform on the development of personal 
reputations by Romanian MPs, special attention is given to the way in which the strong 
influence exercised by party leaders mediates this effect. 
2.3 The Romanian Electoral Reform 
Until the 2008 election Romania used a closed list proportional representation 
system with multiple member electoral districts. The reform of 2008 came as the result 
of long negotiations among the main political parties with the strong involvement of 
the Romanian presidency and civil society. From the moment the idea of electoral 
reform was introduced in the political discourse its explicit goal was to give voters the 
possibility to single out candidates (Pro-Democratia 2008). The system adopted in 
2008 resembles mixed member systems for it requires candidates to run in single-
member districts, yet the final results keep a close connection between the percentage 
of votes and the percentage of seats received by each party. The system however, does 
not include a candidate list element and thus does not fit the mixed-member category as 
defined by Shugart and Wattenberg (2003, 10). Bellow I give a brief presentation of 
these rules, with an emphasis on their main consequences.  
Under the new electoral system the country is split into 42 electoral 
constituencies (circumscriptie), each corresponding to a county. Each constituency is 
further split into single-member electoral districts (colegiu). The number of districts in 
each constituency is proportional to the population of the constituency. As the “single-
member” label implies, each district gives only one seat. The allocation of seats takes 
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place in three stages. In the first stage candidates who gain a majority of votes in their 
districts are elected. The districts where no candidate wins a majority of votes are 
distributed in the second and third stages. In the second stage the votes obtained by 
each party in each constituency are pooled together, and based on their share of votes it 
is determined how many seats each party should get in each constituency. This is done 
by dividing the number of votes by a representation quota and the rounding down of 
that number. The representation quota is obtained by dividing the number of valid 
votes cast in a circumscription by the total number of seats/districts in that 
circumscription. Only parties that pass the 5% threshold take part in this redistribution. 
The seats allocated in the second stage are given to the candidates who win most votes 
in their individual districts, provided their seats are not already taken by candidates 
from other parties through outright majorities.  
The unused votes at the second stage are again pooled by party at the national 
level. The number of unused votes by each party is divided by a representation quota, 
and the rounded number gives the number of extra seats each party gets from those 
seats unallocated in the first two stages11. The individuals who gain these seats are 
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11 To better understand the concept of unused votes I detail the process through which 
the redistributions of seats at the second and third stages are done. At the second stage 
the total number of valid votes cast in a circumscription is divided by the total number 
of seats/districts in that circumscription to obtain the representation quota. This quota 
can be understood as the number of votes necessary to gain one seat. Then the number 
of votes obtained by each party in a circumscription is divided by the representation 
quota to find the number of seats to which a party is entitled in that circumscription. 
Let us take a hypothetical example of a circumscription of 5 districts up for 
redistribution and 3 parties. The results of the divisions by the representation quota for 
the three parties may look something like 1.5, 2.8, and 0.7. The first party gains one 
seat at the second stage redistribution, the second gets 2 seats and the third none. The 
unused percentages (0.5, 0.8 and 0.7), or more likely the number of votes associated 
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decided in a manner similar to the one used at the second stage. The end result is that 
the percentage of votes obtained nationally by a party translates accurately into the 
percentage of seats obtained in the Chamber.  
The system encourages candidates to work harder to become popular with their 
constituents in their district and to develop reputations separate from their party. Thus, 
all Romanian MPs are elected in single member districts, and even if an MP gains her 
seat through redistribution she gains the seat in the single member district in which she 
runs. If elected, she represents the district in which she ran and is expected to run for 
reelection in the same district. At re-election, her performance in parliament is judged 
by the same voters.    
Also, although their fortunes still depend on how their parties fare with voters, 
candidates need to work harder individually to gain the appreciation of voters. In a list 
PR system a candidate who works hard in campaign primarily helps her party and only 
indirectly and marginally helps herself. Candidates face a collective action problem and 
there is little incentive for individual campaigns. Things look different in the new 
electoral system. Even if a candidate comes from a party that is popular in her 
constituency, and thus more likely to gain seats in that constituency, she still needs to 
work hard to either gain an outright majority of votes in the district, or to outperform 
her party colleagues from the other districts in the constituency. Hence, after the 
electoral reform Romanian MPs should put more effort into gaining the personal 
appreciation of their voters. 
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with them are pooled at the national level in the third stage of redistribution. The two 
unallocated seats are to be allocated in the third stage.!
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Furthermore, under the new law candidates run against candidates from other 
parties in their own district, but also against candidates from their own party from 
different districts in the same constituency. To gain a seat through redistribution-- the 
main manner through which seats are allocated-- a candidate is fighting against 
members of her own party. She has to gain more votes than the other candidates from 
her own party in the circumscription. Electoral systems in which candidates compete 
against members of their own party encourage legislators to develop reputations 
distinct from their copartisans’ (Carey 2009, 133)12. 
To qualitatively assess the impact of the electoral reform on MP behavior, in 
the summer of 2009 and the fall of 2010 I interviewed over twenty Romanian MPs. 
Among them there was unanimous agreement that after the reform MPs tend to spend 
more time in their districts and to meet more often with their voters. The assessment of 
Mircia Giurgiu, a deputy who had served in previous terms is particularly relevant: “I 
used to be the only deputy to have weekly meetings with the public. Now many of the 
people who come to see me tell me first what other deputies that he/she has seen 
promised him/her. It is like they are pitting us against each other.” 
While voters were empowered after the electoral reform, the other principal—
party leadership—has kept a strong capacity to punish and/or reward the agent. The 
previous literature on vote unity in parliaments has emphasized a wide range of sticks 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 In the 2008 election candidates seemed well aware of this aspect. In an interview 
taken in the fall of 2010 with deputy Stelian Fuia, he appreciated that the main obstacle 
he had to surpass in the 2008 elections was the leader of his county party organization 
who ran in a different district. The leader of the county party organization asked all 
mayors in the county affiliated with his party not to campaign for Fuia. The purpose of 
the party leader was to surpass Fuia in the number of votes obtained. 
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and carrots that party leaders use to keep backbenchers in line, such as control over the 
list of candidates in elections, the threat of the vote of confidence procedure in 
parliamentary systems, the capacity to expel problematic members, the assignment of 
leadership positions inside the party or the legislature, pork barrel spending, campaign 
support etc. (Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999; Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Huber 
1996). 
Although it is difficult to assess post-reform changes in all sources of party 
control, the analysis of three important sources suggest that party leaders have kept a 
strong capacity to control backbenchers. First, after the electoral reform none of the 
parties has changed its official rules for the selection of candidates in the legislative 
elections (Chiru and Ciobanu 2009, 203). In the pre-reform period, despite variance in 
the selection procedures for the closed list of candidates, the leadership control over 
nominations has been considered strong (see Stefan, 2004). Some party leaderships left 
the nomination at the hands of county organizations (UDMR, PSD), some used a list 
that compromised their needs with those of local organizations (PDL and PNL) while 
others imposed their lists entirely (PC and PRM)13. Despite this variance in procedures, 
in all parties the final list of candidates had to be approved by the central leadership, an 
important control tool in the hands of leaders (Bille 2001; Lundell 2004).  More 
important, none of the parties has changed its nominations procedures. The obvious 
difference is that instead of selecting a ranked list of candidates, now parties select a 
list of candidates for single member districts. Because of this, the task of political !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Party acronyms are as follows: PSD=Social Democratic Party; PNL= National 
Liberal Party; UDMR: Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania; PRM= Greater 
Romania Party; PC= Conservative Party. 
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leaders may be different, yet the final effect similar: after reform party leaders control 
the selection of party candidates for the uninominal districts and implicitly the behavior 
of backbenchers14.  
Also, Romania is still a parliamentary system in which the threat of vote of 
confidence limits the ability of backbenchers to depart from the position of their party 
leadership15. As previous scholarly work has shown, the threat of using a vote of 
confidence is an important tool in the hands of political leaders in their quest for vote 
unity (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Persson and 
Tabellini 2003; Huber 1996).  
Furthermore, post-reform parties have maintained their tools to punish 
disobedient members. There are four such tools included in the statutes of all parties: 
formal warning, loss of leadership positions inside the party, retirement of political 
support for members in public offices, and expulsion. The last two are particularly 
important because running under a party banner has been a sine-qua-non condition for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 One of the deputies I interviewed in the summer of 2009 had changed his party 
affiliation before the 2008 elections. He had shifted from the Greater Romania Party to 
the Liberal Democratic Party. When asked how he got the opportunity to run for the 
Liberal Democratic Party he admitted to have negotiated with the president of the 
party. In return for his allegiance in the Chamber of Deputies in the 2004-2008 term, 
this MP was allowed to run in a safe college in 2008. Similarly, in the aftermath of the 
2009 presidential elections a tape came out in which the Social Democratic candidate 
offered someone an eligible district in the 2008 elections in return for campaign 
funding (Jurnalul 2009). Recently, in a January 2010 late election for an electoral 
district in Bucharest, the 23-year-old son of a wealthy member of the Democratic 
Liberal Party was imposed by the party leader as the party candidate (Sbîrn 2010). 
15 Recently in June of 2010 the Romanian government was able to pass a very 
unpopular piece of legislation that significantly reduced public sector wages and 
pensions by attaching it to a vote of confidence (Bilefsky 2010). !
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election before and after the electoral reform. No independent candidate has ever 
gained a seat in the Chamber of Deputies in the post-communist history. More 
important than the formal existence of these mechanisms is the fact that after the 
reform political leaders have shown willingness to apply them to members who do not 
toe the party line in important votes16.  
To sum up, the electoral reform in Romania made MPs more likely to develop a 
personal connection with their constituencies. At the same time the party leaders’ 
leverage over backbenchers has remained strong.  
To better ascertain the possible consequences of the electoral reform on the 
MPs behavior, Table 2.1 codes the pre and post reform electoral systems in Romania 
based on three different methods: Carey and Shugart (1995), Wallack et al. (2003) and 
Hallerberg and Marier (2004). Based on each of the three methods the incentives to 
develop a personal vote have increased after the electoral reform. Based on Carey and 
Shugart's method (1995), what makes the after reform system more candidate centered 
is the size of the district. In systems in which the party controls the ballot, smaller 
districts lead to more candidate-centered campaigns. The size of the district also 
accounts for the difference in the Hallerberg and Marier (2004) index. The difference 
between the two electoral systems is even stronger based on the Wallack et al. (2003) 
because they consider single member district systems more conducive to personal 
reputations than do Carey and Shugart (1995). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Four of the members of the main governing party (PDL) voted against the reduction 
of wages and pensions in June 2010. The party leadership proposed the exclusion of 
two of them, while two others were given a final warning (Rata and Dordea 2010). 
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<Table 2.1 around here> 
What are the possible effects of this shift towards personal reputation? The 
higher need to satisfy their constituencies pushes MPs to act more independently on the 
legislature floor than they used to before the electoral reform. This may come in 
conflict with the wishes of the party leadership, which has kept strong mechanisms to 
control the backbenchers. However, as the literature on coalition building suggests, it is 
in the interest of party leaders to allow some backbenchers to act independently on 
certain votes that are sensitive with their constituency (Mayhew 1974, 100-101; 
Shepsle 1974; Baron and Ferejohn 1989). If voting against the party makes the MP 
popular with her constituency, this improves her chances of re-election, which in turn 
benefits the party group as a whole. 
Because after the reform backbenchers benefit from the development of 
personal reputations, party leaders should be more inclined to accept vote defections in 
the legislature. In a parliamentary system like Romania in which the cost of disunity is 
high, the leadership is limited in the number and type of votes in which it allows 
defection. After the electoral reform I expect higher levels of defection in the less 
important votes. For the more important votes I expect a smaller-- if any-- effect of the 
electoral reform on vote unity.  
 Vote indiscipline in important votes is more costly for party leaders, and 
therefore in these votes they are expected to fully use their control mechanisms to keep 
backbenchers in line. Even in the absence of party leadership action, in a parliamentary 
system like Romania backbenchers should be induced to unity in important votes. As 
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Diermeier and Feddersen (1998, 616) show, although the vote-of-confidence procedure 
is rarely used, what strengthens cohesion in all votes is the threat of using it. If a piece 
of legislation does not pass, the executive may resend it to the parliament and attach a 
vote of confidence to it. The threat of using the vote of confidence procedure is more 
credible in the more important votes. 
One may argue that MPs have more leeway to vote on relatively unimportant 
votes regardless of their mode of election, and therefore why should one expect a 
change in behavior after the reform in these unimportant votes? The expected change in 
behavior is the result of greater pressures on MPs to satisfy their constituencies. While 
these pressures may be felt for all votes regardless of their importance, party leaders 
have the capacity to resist these pressures, and are more likely to exercise this capacity 
in the important votes in which defection is more costly. Hence, this theoretical 
expectation reflects the two characteristics of the new system emphasized above: 
greater MP responsiveness to voters and strong party leadership leverage.  
MPs elected after the reform are expected to use means other than vote 
defection to impress their constituency more often than MPs in previous parliamentary 
terms. There are several reasons for this. First, there are high costs of vote disunity for 
both party leaders and backbenchers. Backbenchers fear retaliation from leaders, which 
is still strong after reform; also, regardless of the leadership’s actions, vote 
independence may harm MPs for their individual actions may yield results that are 
collectively damaging (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Aldrich 1995). Party leaders are 
also likely to encourage their backbenchers to use these alternative strategies that make 
backbenchers popular with voters and thus offer good electoral prospects for the party 
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overall, and at the same time are less damaging to the party group unity. Crisp (2007, 
1497) notes that party leaders in the Venezuelan National Assembly are more tolerant 
to pre-vote behavior than actual vote position. 
Second, MPs elected after the reform need to impress their constituencies more 
than MPs elected under the old system, yet the benefits of vote independence tend to be 
small. In general, voters are unaware of the voting records of their representatives, and 
political leaders have an information advantage (Ferejohn 1999). Other types of 
behavior are more easily appreciated by voters. For instance, floor interventions and 
visits to the district have a greater impact on voters, especially in an age when they are 
covered by the media. Also, bill initiation can bring voter appreciation not necessarily 
because voters inform themselves about the origin of legislation, but because 
candidates themselves can claim the initiation of popular laws during electoral 
campaigns. Because vote independence brings little benefits, the new MPs are more 
likely to take on other forms of behavior that bring constituency appreciation such as 
legislative initiation, floor interventions or district visits. 
2.4 Data and Models 
To test the theoretical implications the following analyses look at MP behavior 
in the last two terms (2004-2008 and 2008-2012). Two sets of tests with different types 
of dependent variables are run. The first set evaluates the impact of the reform on vote 
behavior in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies. The second set of analyses evaluates 
the hypothesis about alternative strategies through which deputies can improve their re- 
election prospects. 
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2.4.1 Change in Vote behavior 
To test the hypotheses about differences in vote behavior I use the results of all 
electronic votes that took place in the third semester of the 2004-2008 term and the 
second semester of current term (2008-2012)17. The activity of the Chamber of 
Deputies is split into semesters. The electronic vote is the default type of vote in the 
Chamber. The Chamber uses the secret vote for the election of its leadership positions 
or for any other situation if a leader of a party group asks it and a majority of MPs 
approve it through electronic vote. In practice these secret votes are rare. In the two 
semesters under analysis there were nine such votes, less than one percent of the total 
number of votes. 
The database includes a total of over 1400 electronic votes. The dependent 
variable measures the proclivity of an individual MP to defect from her party position 
in each vote. The party position is the vote choice expressed by a plurality of members. 
This research design allows the analysis to control for characteristics of each individual 
vote. This is important because the main theoretical expectation is contingent on type 
of vote. 
<Table 2.2 around here> 
The independent variables are presented in Table 2.2. To capture how important 
each vote is for the party leadership, I create a dummy variable that differentiates !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Ideally one would look at the same period of time within the term. The choice of the 
third semester in one term and the second semester in the other term is dictated by the 
availability of data. The electronic vote was introduced in January 2006, so for the 
2004-2008 term the first semester in which votes were recorded is the third semester 
(January-July 2006). For the 2008-2012 term, only the votes from the first two 
semesters are published on the official website of the Chamber. 
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between final votes on pieces of legislation and all other votes. While this may be 
considered a rough operationalization, it is reasonable to assume that final votes are 
more important than procedural votes or votes on individual articles of a bill. The 
variable Organic Law differentiates between two types of votes that can take place 
inside the Romanian Chamber of Deputies and that require different types of 
majorities: ordinary procedures require a simple majority of all deputies in the room; 
final votes on organic procedures require the support of a majority of all deputies, 
regardless of how many attend the meeting. 
The results of two binomial logit regressions are reported in Table 2.3. To 
recapitulate, I expect the MPs elected in 2008 be more likely to defect in the less 
important votes than those elected in 2004. I do not expect to find the same effect for 
important votes. 
<Table 2.3 around here> 
The tests in the two models in Table 2.3 confirm an interaction between the 
mode of election and the importance of votes. Table 2.4 details the effects of the 
interacted terms on the probability of vote defection. The probabilities are computed 
from the results in Model 2. The changes in probabilities in each of the two columns 
show that in each of the two terms considered the probability of defection is lower in 
final votes than in all other votes.  
The rows of Table 2.4 detail the substantive effect of the electoral reform in 
important and unimportant votes. Figure 2.1 graphs this effect, together with the 95% 
confidence intervals. The results confirm that in unimportant votes MPs elected after 
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reform are more likely to defect than those elected before. Moving from a PR system to 
the new system of elections increases the probability of defection from .033 to .047. 
The relationship found for final votes looks different. The probability changes in 
important votes (third row in Table 2.4) reveal that MPs elected in single member 
districts are less likely to defect than those elected on party lists. In final votes a MP 
elected before the reform has a probability of defection of .027 and a MP elected after 
the reform has a probability of defection of .024.  
<Table 2.4 around here> 
<Figure 2.1 around here> 
 Additional controls are included. Although I account for party effects in three 
of the four models, there is a change in the government coalition between 2006 and 
2009 that is not controlled for by the party dummies. Model 2 includes a dummy 
variable that accounts for whether the MP comes from a party in government. MPs 
from parties in government are less likely to defect. Also, defection is less likely to 
happen in votes that require special majorities than in regular votes (Model 2). Party 
group leaders are less likely to defect, while parliament leaders show more vote 
independence. To help the reader better fathom these findings, column four in Table 
2.3 gives the marginal effects for each predictor.   
To sum up, the analyses of electronic votes support the first part of our 
expectations about the effect of electoral change on MP behavior: under high party 
leadership capacity, MPs elected in single member districts are more likely to vote 
independently than MPs elected on closed lists in the less important votes only; the 
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same effect does not hold for the important votes. If anything, in important votes MPs 
elected after reform seem more likely to stick with their party than those elected before 
it18.  
These effects are statistically significant (see Figure 2.1), yet their magnitude 
may seem small. This is especially the case with the effect of reform on vote behavior 
in important votes. We have to bear in mind however, that we are testing for the effect 
of one of many factors that may influence vote unity. Romania is a parliamentary 
system in which parties display very high levels of unity, a fact attributable to a variety 
of factors such as the existence of confidence procedure. By design, the analysis 
controls for these additional explanatory factors, for they remain constant between the 
two terms. However, it should not be surprising that the only explanans that varies in 
the model has a small effect.  
Also, given the goal of the paper, finding a significant effect is more important 
than the magnitude of the effect. The paper is not primarily concerned with the effect of 
the Romanian electoral reform on the degree of vote unity in the Romanian parliament, 
but with the more general relationship between electoral rules and vote behavior under 
conditions of strong party leadership control. The Romanian reform offers the 
empirical ground to test some theoretical expectations. The relationships found may 
have a small substantive effect in Romania because of many other explanatory factors, 
but this may not be the case in other contexts.  
Next, I examine the hypothesized effects on other forms of MP behavior. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 For validation purposes, I have run the analyses in Table 2.3 using logistic models 
in which I cluster by legislator. The results (unreported here) are similar.  
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2.4.2 Effects of Electoral Reform on Non-Voting MP Behavior 
I expect that the deputies elected in single member districts try to be more 
visible to their voters. This might be reflected in more visits to their districts, more 
speeches on the Chamber floor, or more legislative proposals. To test these 
expectations I look at two different forms of behavior inside the Chamber of Deputies 
that have been previously considered in the literature: law initiation and government 
questioning (see Crisp 2007; Mattson 1995; Franklin and Norton 1993; Searing 1985; 
Raunio 1996). The Romanian legislation allows each deputy the right to initiate 
legislation alone or together with other deputies and senators. Also, each deputy has the 
right to address the Cabinet or individual ministers questions and interpellations to 
which the members of the Cabinet must respond within two weeks (Regulamentul 
Camerei Deputatilor). I expect the deputies elected in 2008 be more likely to initiate 
legislation and to question members of the executive than those elected in 2004. 
The analyses examine these forms of behavior in the first year of each of the 
two terms compared here (January-December, 2005 and January-December, 2009). 
The unit of analysis is the individual deputy. The database includes all deputies who 
served in either 2005 or 2009. Only the deputies who served throughout the entire year 
were considered and those who served in both years were treated as two different 
observations. The operationalization of the independent variables used is presented in 
Table 2.2, and the results of the analyses are presented in Table 2.5. 
<Table 2.5 around here> 
The dependent variable in Models 1 and 2 of Table 2.5 captures the number of 
!!! ^=!
^=!
legislative initiations by each deputy in each of the two years. The Romanian 
Parliament website has information about the total number of laws proposed by each 
deputy alone or together with other deputies in each of the two years under 
consideration. The dependent variable in Models 3 and 4 measures the number of 
questions addressed to government by each MP in each of the two years. To account 
for the fact the Chamber met more often in 2005 than in 2009, and thus offered 
deputies more opportunities to act, the negative binomial regressions includes a 
variable exposure term.  
The results of the negative binomial analyses in Models 1 and 2 of Table 2.5 
show that there is a relationship between the mode of election and the frequency of 
legislative proposals, with the deputies elected in single member districts being more 
likely to introduce legislation19. Also, as the analyses in Models 3 and 4 show, the 
deputies elected in 2008 are more likely to address questions to the members of the 
executive. Both of these activities on the legislature’s floor are likely to improve a 
deputy’s standing in front of her constituency20. 
A number of controls at the individual and party level are used, as described in 
Table 2.2. One can expect party group leaders and parliament leaders to be more active 
and therefore to have higher scores on both dependent variables. This expectation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 The results of the negative binomial regression showed that the overdispersion 
parameter alpha was significantly different from zero. In this case a negative binomial 
regression is considered more appropriate than a poisson regression. 
20 Similar results (unreported here) were obtained with zero-inflated negative binomial 
models. !
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however, is only partially supported by the data. Thus, parliament leaders are less likely 
to address questions to members of government. Also, the test finds the deputies from 
parties in the government coalition to be less likely to question members of the cabinet, 
but more likely to propose legislation. Finally, deputies who served in both terms are 
more likely to initiate legislation and to address questions to members of the cabinet.  
The database includes 89 deputies who fully served in the first year of each 
term. This allows us to compare the behavior of the same deputy at two different 
times, in 2005 and 2009. Table 2.6 presents the results of t-tests that compare the 
differences in behavior for each of the 89 deputies. To account for the fact that the 
Chamber met more often in 2005 than in 2009, the units of analysis are the number of 
legislative initiatives per day and the number of questions per day respectively. The 
results show that the same deputies have become on average more active in the 
Chamber after they were elected in single member districts. The reported t-values 
confirm the fact that the differences are significant. On average, the same deputy is 
likely to propose eight times more pieces of legislation in 2009 than she was in 2005 
and to ask twice as many questions to the executive.  
<Table 2.6 about here> 
 This analysis is important for it looks at the behavior of the same deputies 
before and after a treatment. The results suggest that being elected in single member 
districts and knowing that they will be up for re-election in the same districts makes 
MPs more active inside the Chamber.  
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2.5 Concluding Remarks  
This study reassesses how electoral rules and party leadership influence the 
behavior of MPs in legislatures. The Romanian case sheds light on the effect of an 
electoral reform increasing MPs' responsibility to voters, while leaving the capacity of 
party leadership unchanged.  
The article confirms the importance of party leadership strength and connects it 
to parliamentary systems of government. The role of leadership is not only additive but 
interactive, as it mediates the effect that other system characteristics may have on vote 
behavior. In Romania after the electoral reform party leaders have kept a strong 
influence over backbenchers. Although the new electoral law encourages the 
development of personal reputation, its impact on floor vote defection has been 
minimal, with MPs elected in single member districts being more likely to defect in the 
less important votes that do not seriously damage party leaders.  
These findings come counter to recent research on the Congress of the United 
States.  Cox and Poole (2002) find that individual defections are more likely to take 
place in the important votes.  These two sets of findings should not be regarded as 
contradictory, but rather as reflections of different relations of power between the two 
principals: in Romania party leadership is strong, whereas in a presidential and federal 
system like the US the power of the constituency increases at the expense of that of 
party leaders. In Romania MPs defect when leaders allow them to do so (unimportant 
votes), whereas in the US congressmen defect when the votes are important to their 
constituencies. 
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This study also confirms the fact that MPs elected in single member districts are 
more responsive to their voters, but shows that MPs can use means other than vote 
independence in the legislature to gain constituency support. In Romania the MPs 
elected in 2008 in single member districts are more likely to initiate legislation and to 
address questions to members of the executive than the MPs elected in 2004 on party 
lists. Although these are only two of many possible actions that MPs can take, it is 
reasonable to assume that they reflect a general difference. These results suggest that 
using non-voting means to gain constituency support, such as initiating legislation or 
questioning members of the Cabinet makes both backbenchers and party leaders better 
off. One may argue that constituencies are also better off. A MP who works hard to 
propose new legislation that favors her district may be more beneficial to her 
constituency than an MP who repeatedly departs from the vote position of her party. 
Therefore, not finding a relationship between election mode in mixed member 
systems and vote behavior on the floor (see Haspel, Remington, and Smith 1998; also 
Herron 2002) does not mean that the “best of the two worlds” literature has it wrong. 
MPs elected in single member districts in mixed systems may be more responsive to 
their voters than their peers elected on party lists, but it may be more beneficial to all 
actors involved to respond to constituency accountability through means other than 
vote independence.
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3. Increasing Representative Accountability through Electoral Laws: 
The Consequences of the 2008 Romanian Electoral Reform 
3.1 Introduction 
Proportional representation became widespread in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, when under pressure to enlarge the franchise many governments 
ditched their plurality electoral systems (Shugart and Wattenberg 2003; Cusack et al 
2007). One interesting consequence has been that elected representatives became less 
connected to their constituencies. According to Shugart and Wattenberg (2001), in the 
last two decades or so, many countries have sought to strengthen ties between MPs 
and their constituents through the adoption of mixed electoral systems. These systems 
have some of the representatives elected in single member districts (SMDs) and some 
on lists, and thus combine MP accountability to voters (through SMDs) with 
proportionality (as a consequence of the list element). 
Mixed systems to date have fallen short of entirely fulfilling the two 
desiderata. The list element makes MPs less accountable to their constituents. Where 
the list tier and the SMD tier are separately elected (parallel systems), elections may 
yield disproportional results. Therefore, mixed systems offer the opportunity to 
balance the degree to which each of the two goals are reached, but so far have failed to 
yield the reformers’ ideal of full proportionality and full accountability21. 
In 2008, Romania adopted an electoral system that has the prospect of offering 
the best of both worlds: it elects all candidates in single member districts and at the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21Full accountability refers here to having all members individually accountable to 
their voters through being elected in single member districts.   
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same time yields proportional results. The Romanian electoral system presents itself as 
an attractive alternative for electoral reformers, for it seeks to combine proportionality 
and accountability. 
This chapter assesses the extent to which the reform has fulfilled its promises. 
It does so with the help of post election surveys as well as in depth interviews held 
with members of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies in the fall of 201022. The 
assessment is done with the help of a theoretical framework developed by Shugart 
(2001). Broadly, this framework analyzes electoral systems based on how they tie 
MPs to voters and how they translate the proportions of votes obtained by parties into 
proportions of seats in legislatures. Although the analysis is based on a single case, the 
empirical observations are done at multiple time points (see Rueschemeyer 2003). The 
electoral reform provides a unique opportunity to test some fundamental expectations 
about electoral systems for we can compare observations on dependent variables 
before and after the reform. The fact that one country is observed at different points in 
time allows the study to control for some confounding factors.   
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section introduces the theoretical 
framework provided by Shugart (2001). This is followed by a brief history of the 
Romanian reform with a focus on the goals of reformers. Section four assesses the 
extent to which these goals have been achieved. The paper ends with some remarks 
about the effect of electoral rules on accountability and proportionality.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 The entire content of the interviews cited in this paper is available on the author’s 
website.  
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3.2 Avoiding Extremes in Elections: Shugart’s Theoretical Scheme  
In a widely cited work Shugart (2001) argues that modern day electoral 
reforms are driven by extreme values on two dimensions that characterize each 
electoral system: the interparty dimension and the intraparty dimension.  
The interparty dimension looks at the translation of party votes into parliament 
seats and implicitly, the representation of small interests. At one extreme majoritarian 
systems of representation benefit two major parties at the expense of smaller parties. 
In such systems representativeness is low. This phenomenon led to the reform in New 
Zealand in the nineties (Denemark 2001). At the other extreme, highly representative 
systems allow smaller interests to be heard, but fail to offer voters clear choices of 
government selection at the polls. Cabinet formation involves post election 
negotiations, and thus voters have little input into the selection of the executive (see 
Powel 2000). These systems may also lead to fragmented party systems and cabinet 
instability. The Italian electoral reform was driven by such problems (Katz 2003). 
The intraparty dimension taps the degree to which electoral systems encourage 
candidates to develop personal or party reputations. At one extreme, there are closed 
list proportional systems in which voters choose party lists that are crafted by party 
leaders. Popular support for more individual accountability and implicitly for electoral 
reform is likely to emerge. This is what caused the Venezuelan reform of the nineties 
(Crisp and Rey 2001). At the other extreme, systems where candidates are encouraged 
to run on individual platforms as opposed to party banners lead to populist appeals and 
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the development of clientelistic ties between legislators and voters. The reform in 
Japan was driven by such situation (Reed and Thies 2003). 
According to Shugart (2003), the recent wave of electoral reforms in 
democratic societies is a move towards mixed systems, for these systems offer the 
prospect of moving away from extremes on either of the two dimensions, in search for 
what Shugart (2003, 28) calls “a theoretical midpoint of electoral efficiency.” Mixed 
systems elect some of legislators in single member districts and some on party lists. 
On the intra-party dimension they encourage individual accountability through single 
member districts. At the same time they can maintain party allegiances through the 
list, and thus avoid hyper-personalistic electoral campaigns. On the inter-party 
dimension the mixed systems may lead to proportional electoral results through the list 
element, but if needed, they can decrease proportionality to form strong party 
majorities and thus increase executive efficiency23.  
Applied to the Romanian reform, Shugart’s (2003) model highlights perceived 
shortcomings on the intraparty dimension, caused by low individual accountability, 
coupled with low public confidence in the political class. There were no shortcomings 
on the interparty dimension. At least they were not present in the discourse of 
reformers. Below I give a brief history of the reform process, with an emphasis on the 
causes of the reform.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 The degree of proportionality is influenced by two main choices at the hands of 
reformers: the proportion of legislators elected through each tier and the degree of 
linkage between the two tiers (see Shugart and Wattenberg, 2003, 14-15).  
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3.3 The History of the Romanian Electoral Reform 
Until 2008 Romania used a closed-list proportional system of elections with 42 
multi-member districts. Dissatisfaction with the system grew in early 2000s, linked to 
increasing levels of distrust in members of political class in general and of parliament 
in particular. Confidence in political class had been historically low in Romania, but it 
reached a nadir in the 2000s, when, under pressure from the European Union, 
Romanian governments took some anti-corruption measures24. Fight against 
corruption became an important part of political rhetoric, and was associated with little 
public responsiveness to constituents (Pro-Democratia 2008, 17) It was believed that 
the closed list system benefitted corrupt and irresponsive politicians, elected because 
of their connections within their party. These connections were maintained through 
money and cronyism (Marian and King 2010, 10).  
When the reform movement was initiated by the NGO called Pro-Democratia 
in mid 1990s, it was motivated by the alleged need to clean up the political class. It 
was believed that adopting a system that allowed voters to single out candidates would 
weed out old school legislators associated with the closed-list system of elections 
(Pro-Democratia 2008). Also, the system would make MPs more accountable to voters 
and thus more attentive to their needs.  
From 2000 to 2007 Pro-Democratia led an intense campaign of informing the 
public about the benefits of reform, coupled with an effort at gaining the support of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Surveys taken at the beginnings of the 2000s showed that the public confidence in 
the institution of Parliament was continuously decreasing (see Pro-Democratia 2008, 
6). 
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political leaders. In 2006 the Parliament created a commission in charge with electoral 
reform, but its work was thwarted by disagreements among parties (Pro-Democratia 
2008, 21). 
The reformers’ efforts received a boost in 2007 when President B!sescu 
decided to join the campaign, and to push the parliament into adopting a new electoral 
law before the 2008 elections. While B!sescu had previously affirmed his support for 
reform, his decision to take an active role was determined by the decision of the 
Parliament to suspend him in April of 2007 for alleged accusations of breaking the 
Constitution. According to the Romanian Constitution the suspension of the president 
by the parliament must be confirmed by a national referendum held within a month 
after the suspension (Constitu"ia României, Art. 95). If the referendum fails to confirm 
the suspension, the president maintains her/his job. The President’s campaign for 
referendum was directed against the members of the parliament, who were portrayed 
as products of the corrupt political system, interested in pursuing the will of their party 
leaders and unconcerned with the wishes of their constituents. The results of the 
referendum gave support to B!sescu’s claims, as a large majority of voters (74%) 
stood by their president and voted against the parliament. The result of the referendum 
gave B!sescu legitimacy and led to a stronger push for reform (Marian and King 2010, 
10).  
As a consequence, in November 2007 B!sescu called a new referendum in 
which voters were asked whether they agreed to replace the closed list PR system with 
a majoritarian two-round system (Fe#nic and Armeanu 2009). Although over 80% of 
voters opted for reform, the referendum was invalid because of low turnout. As the 
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promoter of this version of reform B!sescu was looking for popularity at the expense 
of legislature, but also for electoral benefits for his party, the Liberal Democratic Party 
(PDL). A two round majoritarian system like the one used in France is likely to benefit 
the larger parties (see Lijphart 1994). The party of the president was the most popular 
at the time.  
This version of reform was not well received by Prime Minister C!lin 
Popescu-T!riceanu, who was the leader of the National Liberal Party (PNL), the third 
largest party at the time.  In the fall of 2007 he proposed a mixed member proportional 
system similar to the one in Germany. His legislative proposal however, was declared 
unconstitutional by the Romanian Constitutional Court. After more discussions in the 
first months of 2008 the political parties and Pro-Democratia reached a compromise 
solution, a law that requires all candidates to run in single member districts but at the 
same time yields proportional results. The new law is described in section 2.3 of this 
dissertation. 
The most interesting consequence of this complicated system is the fact that a 
candidate may win a district even if she came in second, third or fourth place. These 
outcomes are not unusual. Only 76% of all members of the Chamber of Deputies 
elected in 2008 finished first in their districts (Alegeri Parlamentare 2008).  
The new law requires all candidates to run in single-member districts, and thus 
reflects the driving force behind the reform: the need to make legislators individually 
accountable to voters. Reformers did not intend any consequences over the interparty 
dimension. The pre-reform system was proportional, but not to an extent that would 
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cause extreme party fragmentation and political instability.  Shugart (2003) develops an 
index of electoral efficiency and ranks countries based on how they manage to balance 
the need for proportionality with the need for clarity of responsibility for policy 
making. I computed this index for Romania using election results from 1992 to 2004. 
Figure 3.1 reproduces a chart from Shugart (2003, Fig. 2.1), which aligns a series of 
democracies based on the index scores on the interparty dimension. For comparison, I 
add the score of pre-reform Romania. Figure 3.1 shows that pre-reform Romania falls 
in the representative systems area, but is far from the hyper-representative extreme. On 
the contrary, of the countries in the representative group, Romania is second closest to 
the “0” mid-point of efficiency, being surpassed only by New Zealand post 1995 
reform.   
<Figure 3.1 around here> 
As a consequence, the final version agreed upon was intended to yield 
proportional results. While the President promoted a less proportional law, he 
emphasized the changes it would bring on the intraparty dimension, and shunned the 
possible consequences for the proportionality of the system25.  
Below I evaluate the consequences of the reform. The main criterion used is the 
degree to which the reform helps avoid extremes on the two dimensions in Shugart 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 In the days leading to the referendum for the two-round majoritarian system 
President B!sescu created a free telephone line that the voters could use to inform 
themselves about the referendum. Callers could hear a message that began with the 
greeting: “I am Traian B!sescu president of Romania. I am inviting you to clean up.” 
The message gave a detailed presentation of the effects of the law on the renewal of 
the political class, but said nothing about possible effects on the proportionality of the 
system (see România Liber! 2007a).  
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(2003), and thus helps approximate the ideal mid-point of efficiency. Additionally, I 
judge the results of reform against the intentions of the reformers.  
3.4 The Assessment of the Reform 
3.4.1 Effects on the Interparty Dimension 
One of the heralded merits of the 2008 electoral law is its proportionality (Pro-
Democra"ia 2008, 11). This proportionality is maintained without the help of a party 
list, in a system in which all legislators represent single member districts.  
Table 3.1 shows the percentages of seats and votes obtained by the parties 
represented in the parliament in the last five elections. The results for both Senate and 
the Chamber of Deputies are reported. The 2008 results show that after the reform the 
system has remained highly proportional. The index of disproportionality reported in 
row three, suggests that the 2008 reform in fact increased proportionality. However, 
Marian and King (2010) show through simulations that given the 2008 vote results, 
the distribution of seats among parties would have been nearly identical under both the 
2004 and 2008 electoral rules. Hence the higher proportionality of the 2008 elections 
is not a function of the electoral system, but of idiosyncrasies.  
<Table 3.1 around here> 
Despite the accuracy with which it translates votes into seats, the new electoral 
law may disadvantage small parties because of what Duverger (1972) calls 
psychological factors associated with the wasted vote problem. The wasted vote 
problem is associated with electoral systems that fail to accurately translate 
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proportions of votes into proportions of seats in the parliament. It has two aspects—
mechanical and psychological— that lead to disadvantages for small parties (Duverger 
1972, 248). The mechanical aspect states that in majoritarian systems the votes for 
small parties are less likely to be translated into seats and therefore are lost. The 
psychological aspect states that supporters of small parties, being aware of the 
mechanical aspect, are less likely to cast their vote for their preferred party and instead 
vote for a larger party that is close to their ideological preferences. Both of these 
mechanisms help large parties at the expense of small ones.  
The 2008 Romanian electoral law does not create the mechanical part of the 
wasted vote problem. There are however two aspects of the new law that may activate 
psychological factors leading to the wasted vote problem. 
First, although every vote eventually counts at one of the three rounds of seat 
allocation, sympathizers of small parties face the choice of influencing the fate of their 
own district or the overall distribution of seats in the chamber. A vote for the 
candidate of a small party in a given district is not lost for it helps your preferred party 
overall, but at redistribution the party may or may not get the seat in your district. 
Hence a vote for a small party may help the party overall, but not the party candidate 
in your own district. On the other hand a vote for the candidate of a larger party in the 
same district that is still close to your ideological preferences may be preferred for it 
gives you more leverage in determining your own representative. 
Second, there is strong evidence that at the time of elections voters were 
unaware of many aspects of the electoral law, including the redistribution element (see 
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Fe#nic and Armeanu 2009, 7). Even members of the political class were not 
completely aware of how redistribution would work. In the aftermath of elections the 
fact that candidates won seats while finishing second, third, or even fourth—a direct 
consequence of the redistribution process—was portrayed in the media as an oddity 
(Antena 3 2008). If voters are asked to cast their vote for one candidate without being 
fully aware of the redistribution process they should act as in a single member district 
plurality system and thus vote for larger parties. 
To the extent that these two mechanisms are at play, given that none of the 
prescriptions of the new law benefits smaller parties, the 2008 law should 
disadvantage small parties. Empirical evidence from a post-2008 election survey 
support this claim. The European Social Survey was administered in Romania 
between December 2 and December 30 of 2008. The parliamentary elections were 
held on November 30. Two survey questions interest us: one asks respondents to say 
whether they feel close to any of the main political parties (party closeness); the other 
question asks respondents about their vote preference in the November elections (vote 
choice). With no wasted vote problem there should be a near perfect correlation 
between party closeness and vote choice.  
Table 3.2 reports the cumulative results for the four parties represented in the 
parliament26. Of the 267 respondents who feel close to PDL and went to the polls, 260 
(over 97%) voted for their preferred party. Roughly the same percentage of PSD !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 The choice of limiting the analysis to the parties represented in the parliament was 
dictated by the small number of people who declared themselves close to a given 
party, which makes the analysis difficult. This small sample problem is more acute for 
the small parties. As a consequence, I decided to only look at the sympathizers of the 
parties represented in the parliament.  
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sympathizers voted for PSD. The situation is quite different for center-right National 
Liberal Party (PNL), which finished third in the 2008 elections. Of the 103 PNL 
sympathizers who went to the polls, only 91, representing 88 % voted for a PNL 
candidate. Even more, most of the PNL defectors (eight respondents) voted for the 
other party of center-right orientation27, the larger PDL. This is what the wasted vote 
theory would predict. Interestingly enough none of the 7 defectors of larger PDL gave 
their vote to PNL.  
<Tables 3.2 and 3.3 around here> 
Table 3.3 reports the aggregate answers to the same questions from the 2009 
European Elections Study, conducted immediately after the 2009 election for the 
European Parliament. The vote choice is for elections to the European Parliament in 
which a closed list proportional system with a single, national district is used28. If the 
differences in the 2008 survey are caused by the electoral law, they should not be 
present in the post European election survey. The information in Table 3.3 confirms 
this expectation. The rate of defection for the two large parties (PSD and PDL) is 
larger than in the 2008 parliamentary elections. Only 93% of PDL supporters voted for 
the PDL list and only 92% of PSD supporters voted for the PSD list. At the same time, 
PNL displays the largest degree of vote devotion among its supporters, opposite to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Appreciation made based on their scores on the left-right dimension given in the 
2006 Chapel Hill expert survey (see Hooghe et al 2010). 
28 Ideally, one would want to compare the 2008 post-election survey with 2004 post-
election surveys. Unfortunately, I could not find any post 2004 elections survey that 
includes both questions of interests.  
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what the post 2008 election survey has found. 96% of PNL supporters voted for the 
PNL list in the 2009 European elections.  
Things are less clear for the Hungarian minority party, UDMR, which displays 
an almost perfect level of vote devotion in both elections. UDMR is a special case for 
its voters are not united by ideological preferences, but by shared ethnicity. Hence the 
high degree of vote allegiance is likely to be a function of both stronger identification 
with the party and lack of party alternatives. 
A system that benefits the two largest parties is not necessarily a bad thing. It 
may move the country to a more majoritarian system with two strong parties. In such 
systems voters are given more clear choices of governments before the elections, 
which may increase the clarity of responsibility and thus the efficiency of the system 
on the interparty dimension (Shugart 2003, 30; Powell 2000). Therefore I remain 
agnostic about the normative effects of the wasted vote problem. The effects however, 
were not intended by reformers. On the contrary, Pro-Democra"ia (2008, 17) lauds the 
fact that the 2008 elections brought the most proportional results in the post-
communist period. Also, as the comparison with other systems in Figure 3.1 shows, 
there was no need for a move to a more majoritarian system.  
The political leaders I interviewed in the fall of 2010 seemed unaware of the 
wasted vote problem. The MPs from PNL believed that the new law does not bring 
them advantages nor disadvantages compared to the 2004 law29. The MPs from other 
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29 This became apparent in a discussion I had over dinner with two Liberal deputies. 
During our discussion I brought empirical evidence that pointed to the wasted vote 
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parties believed that PNL was actually advantaged by the new system. The words of a 
Liberal Democrat deputy (Personal interview 5) are relevant in this sense: 
“The system surely benefits PNL which gains many seats without 
winning districts. For example even the leader of the party, Crin Antonescu, 
gained his seat despite finishing third in his district.30” 
 
The words of this Liberal Democrat deputy point to the importance of 
counterfactual in any comparison. If we compare the 2008 system to a single member 
district plurality or a majoritarian two round system, then the new system clearly 
benefits PNL. However, if we compare the new system with the previous one—as one 
should—it becomes apparent that PNL is disadvantaged. Also, they suggest that there 
are differences in how deputies are perceived by their peers based on the place in 
which they finished in their district. Among the interviewed deputies, some were eager 
to mention they had finished first in their districts (see Personal interviews 7, 3). These 
differences in rank and status may also be perceived by constituents. Given that most 
MPs elected without winning their districts come from small parties, this consequence 
of the reform also benefits larger parties.  
To sum up, on the interparty dimension, the new Romanian electoral system 
maintains the proportionality of the previous system intact. The new system, however, 
may advantage large parties because of two secondary mechanisms. First, the system !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
problem and its effect on their party’s vote share, but they were all dismissed (see 
Personal interview 2). 
30 This opinion was not singular. For instance, another deputy saw the final version of 
the law as a concession made by PSD to their government partners PNL (Personal 
interview 7).  
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encourages the psychological aspect of the wasted vote problem, which leads 
supporters of small parties to vote for larger parties. Second, the MPs from small 
parties are more likely to be elected without winning their district. To the extent that 
this translates into lower legitimacy in the eyes of voters, these MPs have a handicap 
at reelection.  
3.4.2 Effects on the Intraparty Dimension 
The principal goal of the reform was to increase MPs’ individual 
accountability. There were two consequences that derive from accountability that were 
intended by reformers: 1) the renewal of the political class; 2) higher MP 
responsiveness to constituents’ needs. The discussion below analyzes the extent to 
which these desiderata were achieved.  
3.4.2.1 The Renewal of the Political Class  
Giving voters more power to “throw the rascals out” was the most advertised 
goal of reform. Voting in single member districts allows voters to single out unpopular 
politicians who under the old system allegedly gained their seats because of party 
connections and money. To assess whether the reform has brought this outcome, I first 
compare the rates of incumbent success in the last four elections. The election results 
depict a mixed picture. Figure 3.2 compares the proportion of winning candidates who 
served in the previous term in four elections for the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate. Thirty seven percent of the deputies elected in 2008 served in the 2004-2008 
term, a proportion similar to those in the previous three elections. Things look 
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different for the 2008-2012 Senate, in which only 24 percent of the senators served in 
the previous term. This share is significantly smaller than those of previous senates.  
<Figure 3.2 around here> 
The lower incumbency rate for the 2008 Senate is in part explained by the 
candidate selection process. Thus, only 50 percent of senators who finished their 
2000-2004 term found themselves on the ballot in the 2008 elections, compared to 65 
percent of 2008 incumbent deputies (Romanian Senate 2010; Romanian Chamber of 
Deputies 2010; BEC 2004; BEC 2008). The selection procedures for the 2008 
elections differed among parties, but the same party had identical procedures for both 
chambers (Chiru 2010). Political parties may adjust their list of candidates for the 
single member districts as a response to public dissatisfaction with incumbent 
politicians. Hence, the fewer candidates selected from among incumbent senators may 
be a reflection of higher public dissatisfaction with senators than with deputies. I am 
not aware of such difference in perception, and with the information at hand one 
cannot establish a definitive explanation for the different fates of incumbent senators 
and deputies.  
More important than the mere rate of replacement is the quality of the new 
members. Has the 2008 reform brought in fewer MPs associated with the old practices 
of corruption and traffic of influence? To judge whether this goal was achieved I use 
the candidate assessments performed by the NGO Alianta pentru o Romanie Curata 
(Alliance for a Clean Romania-ARC). ARC has issued lists of undesirable candidates 
before the 2004 and 2008 parliamentary elections. Unfortunately ARC has changed 
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the criteria for inclusion, and therefore the lists are not comparable. The one criterion 
used in both lists is the candidates’ use of state resources for personal benefit, or the 
benefit of other people connected to the candidate. Based on this criterion I create two 
new lists of “corrupt MPs” which include candidates accused of one or more of the 
following: the use of public positions for personal or family gains; breaking the 
principle of free competition through allocating state contracts to relatives or friends; 
outright acts of bribery. 
<Table 3.4 around here> 
 The data reported in Table 3.4 suggest that corrupt candidates were less 
fortunate in 2008 than in 2004. First, the overall number of such candidates decreased 
in 2008, suggesting that parties became more careful about the process of candidate 
selection. It is however, difficult to assess whether this trend is a function of the 
electoral law. The fight against corruption became a much more salient issue after the 
center-right coalition took power in 2004, and thus voters became more aware of 
corrupt candidates31.  
A second observation drawn from Table 3.4 is that a smaller proportion of 
corrupt candidates were elected in 2008 than in 2004. Only 58% of corrupt candidates 
were elected in 2008, compared to 74% in 2004. It may be that voters became more 
aware of corruption practices after 2004. However, even if voters had been more 
aware of candidates’ behavior in 2004, there was little they could do to prevent their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Under pressure from the EU the national authorities intensified the fight against 
corruption and a considerable number of corruption cases came to the public eye. As a 
proof, 19 of the candidates on the 2008 list were put under accusation for corruption 
acts, whereas none of the candidates on the 2004 list was in such position. 
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election. The fact that the two electoral systems are so different makes comparisons 
difficult. All we can do is look at the overall number of corrupt candidates, which 
ignores important additional information. Thus, we do not account for the fact that 
some candidates were on better positions on the closed list than others in 2004 or that 
some ran in safer colleges than others in 2008. It may be that fewer corrupt candidates 
were elected in 2008 because they were put in less safe districts, while many corrupt 
candidates were on eligible positions on the 2004 closed lists. Since we do not have 
such information and the safeties of candidacies in the two elections are difficult to 
compare, the results in Table 3.4 should be interpreted with caution.  
The interviews held with deputies revealed two additional negative features of 
the new MPs: they tend to have high financial capabilities, which helped them get the 
party nomination and win their seat; some MPs are popular figures with little or no 
legislative expertise.  
Individual campaign finance has historically been important in Romania 
because of the little amount of government campaign funds (Chiru 2010), but has 
become even more important after the reform. Under the pre-reform system the benefit 
of money brought by individual candidates spread among all candidates on the party 
list. Candidates running in single member districts however, make more use of the 
money they invest. The campaign they are financing helps them primarily, and only 
marginally their party colleagues who run in different districts. This in turn increases 
the value of individual finances, and candidates who can raise money—their own 
money or money from sponsors—are more likely to be selected to run in safer 
districts, and to win those districts. This expectation is empirically confirmed by the 
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wealth distribution among the newly elected MPs. Chiru (2010) finds that the 2008 
election has brought in a large number of wealthy people, most of which finance their 
campaigns almost entirely.  
The increased role of money in candidate selection and election is confirmed 
by one of the interviewees: 
“The vote in uninominal colleges brought popular personalities such as 
actors who are good on TV, but are uninterested in the situation in the college 
they represent. Such an example is Mircea Diaconu, who is a senator from my 
region, yet never takes trips to his college. Another negative aspect is the fact 
that many enter because they have money, and that’s why we have many 
wealthy and influential people, but without expertise in areas where they are 
needed. That’s why many of my older colleagues think that in the permanent 
committees the quality of members has decreased significantly. Before there 
were members with expertise in certain areas, who were not very good at going 
to the rural areas of their districts and interacting with people” (Personal 
interview 3). 
 
Similarly, another deputy (Personal interview 8) talked openly about the 
practice of buying candidacies in safe districts. The election of plutocrats is not only 
an unintended effect of reform, but comes quite contrary to what reformers had in 
mind. The election of wealthy and presumably corrupt MPs was among the main 
criticisms brought to the old system (Pro-Democra"ia 2008). 
The words of interviewee 3 emphasize another negative effect of the new 
electoral law: it encourages the inclusion on ballots of popular figures who are easily 
identified by voters for reasons other than their political acumen or connection to 
voters in the electoral college. Another deputy (Personal interview 1) admitted he was 
asked to run because he was a well-known surgeon in his town and despite his lack of 
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political experience. Similarly, another deputy (Personal interview 4) believed he won 
his seat simply because people knew him as a reputable university professor.    
3.4.2.2 MP Responsiveness to Voters 
The reform was to lead to higher individual accountability, and thus to increase 
the responsiveness of MPs to the needs of their constituencies. This is the benefit of 
individual accountability most often mentioned in the literature (Carey 2007; Carey 
2009) and was present in the vocabulary of Romanian reformers (Marian and King 
2010, 12). For instance, in the aftermath of the 2007 referendum, President B!sescu 
emphasized the disconnect between the MPs who had voted for his suspension and the 
will of the constituents they represented.  
More responsive MPs should take more input from the people they represent. 
When voting on the chamber floor, as well as when drafting legislation, MPs should 
be more attentive to their constituents’ needs. The higher individual accountability 
brought by reform offered the prospect of increased popular legislative input. The 
analysis in chapter 2 finds that the Romanian deputies elected in 2008 are more likely 
to propose legislation and to ask questions to members of the Cabinet than those 
elected in 2004. Being more active in the Chamber, however, may be a function of 
higher responsiveness, or of mere desire to appear active (see Mattson 1995; 
Cumberbatch et al. 1992; Franklin and Norton 1993, p.109; Wiberg and Koura 1994, 
35).  
While it is difficult to establish to what extent the change in MP behavior 
found in chapter 2 is a function of concern for constituents’ needs or mere theatre, the 
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interviews taken with Romanian deputies reveal serious barriers in the transmission of 
public intentions to legislators. Almost all deputies interviewed said that they take a 
lot of input from their constituencies, yet they had hard times naming specific 
channels through which they learned their voters’ preferences. The only available 
channel is the weekly meeting with constituents, a channel emphasized by all deputies 
interviewed. Every weekend the MPs travel to their home districts to hold audiences. 
While audiences are not a new phenomenon, they have become widespread after the 
2008 reform.  
The audiences offer voters a great opportunity to influence the legislative 
process. In reality however, they fall short of reaching this goal. Most requests brought 
forward by constituents are disconnected from the legislative process and related to 
personal problems. There was general agreement among the deputies interviewed that 
most requests were for jobs, social housing, interventions in the judicial process etc. 
(see Personal interviews 1, 5, 6, 9, 10). One deputy appreciated that most questions 
should be addressed to members of the local councils: 
“Ninety nine percent of requests are from people who do not have a 
job, their sewage is broken, gypsies stole their sewage caps to sell them, they 
have contestations in courts. All these things fall outside of a MPs attributions. 
That is why I plan on initiating a law that would introduce the uninominal 
system for the election of members of local councils. Most of the requests that 
I receive should target members of local councils (Personal interview 1).” 
 
People prefer to go to their MPs instead of their local representatives because 
the reform has made MPs more accessible and because they are regarded as influential 
people. Other than regular voters, a special category of audience attendees are 
community leaders such as mayors or priests who look for funds for their towns or 
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churches. The opinion of another deputy vis-à-vis the role of audiences as instruments 
of fund allocation is reflective of the general opinion among the deputies interviewed: 
“In general, there is little knowledge about what voters should expect 
from their representatives. There is a prejudice that makes voters harass their 
elected officials, to lobby some people who are perceived as mere managers of 
funds. As a consequence all that is expected are funds for local schools, roads, 
churches. The MP is forced to influence funds allocation, which brings 
advantages to gutsy MPs and encourage them to develop certain relationships 
with other colleagues, behaviors that do not benefit the country overall, but 
only certain regions with gutsy and well connected MPs.” (Personal interview 
6; also see Personal interview 3) 
 
The newly developed relationships between MPs and their local communities 
suggest a move towards the other extreme on the intraparty dimension: the 
development of personal, clientelistic relationships between elected officials and their 
local community. The situation described by interviewee 6 does not differ from the 
situation in Japan before the electoral reform (see Reed and Thies 2001). In the 
process of development of personalistic ties local community leaders play a crucial 
role. Thus, most requests by individual voters are difficult to pursue because they fall 
outside of the jurisdiction of the MP and because they bring little electoral benefit. 
Requests for funds by community leaders such as mayors, priests or school principals 
on the other hand, are easier to meet and more electorally rewarding (see Young 2009, 
1). According to another deputy (Personal interview 10), the allocation of funds to 
local districts, mediated by mayors, is the main source of appreciation by voters: 
“It is very difficult for the electorate to judge the performance of their 
representatives. For instance, a mayor is easily scrutinized based on how much 
he built, the quantity of funds attracted to the town etc. As a MP it is more 
difficult to present your accomplishments to your constituents. This is usually 
done through the mayors. If for example I obtain some funds for a town within 
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my electoral college, I travel with the mayor to that town, he introduces me to 
the people and tells them about the funds I obtained for them.” 
 
The development of such clientelistic ties is likely to benefit the MPs from the 
parties in power, for they have more control over the purse. Thus, the development of 
clientelistic ties has helped the Mexican Partido Revolucionario Institucional and the 
Japanese Liberal Democratic Party win elections for many decades (Magaloni 2006; 
Scheiner 2006). While parties in power in Romania have always used allocation of 
funds for electoral purposes, the practice has become more important after reform, 
when directing funds to local communities has become more politically rewarding. 
Just as it is the case with personal campaign money, obtaining funds for the local 
community before the reform helped the individual MP only indirectly through 
bringing more votes for the party list. After reform however, MPs who bring money to 
their local communities can individually be singled out at the polls.  
The roles of clientelistic relationships and funds allocation are reflected in the 
patterns in which constituents see MPs during audience time. Thus, voters do not 
necessarily go to the representative of their district (see Personal interviews 6, 11, 2). 
They are more likely to see a representative from their county—but not necessarily 
their district—who is a well-known political figure and thus perceived as more 
influential. Preferably this representative should come from a party in power32.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 To test this assertion I visited deputy Ioan Oltean on a Friday during his audience 
time in the city of Bistrita. Oltean is the vice president of PDL, the leading party in the 
governing coalition and vice-president of the Chamber of Deputies. He also comes 
from a small county and is by far the most influential politician in that county. As a 
consequence the waiting room at his office was packed with people from all over the 
county, mostly mayors affiliated with PDL and priests looking for money. The 
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The disconnect between the legislative actions of representatives and the needs 
of their constituents may be a function of the centralized character of politics in 
Romania. Accounting for the needs of your constituents implies that constituents have 
such distinct needs. Based on the interview data it seems like the issues that 
constituents care about have a national rather than a local character: 
“ The citizens of Deva [the deputy’s town] are first influenced by 
national issues; Deva is not a special place with its own laws and the lives of 
citizens are influenced by national not local politics” (Personal interview 2). 
 
Similarly, another deputy (Personal interview 6) suggested that 
consultations with voters should not be done across counties, but across social 
categories. Rather than thinking about the needs of citizens in a given county, 
which do not differ substantially from the needs of the country as a whole, 
MPs should listen to the needs of professors, business owners, miners etc. (also 
see Personal interview 2).  
This situation may be a function of the fact that Romania is a unitary and 
centralized state, in which local politics have not played a major role. Also, the 
previous system of elections did not encourage the development of locally driven 
concerns. It is possible that the new electoral system will lead to such development, 
but as of now there is little evidence pointing to that direction.    
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
meetings were short and unorganized and often times interrupted by people who 
would just walk in. At the same time in the same city deputy Ioan Tintean was also 
holding his audiences, yet the office was almost empty. He is a first term deputy from 
an opposition party.  
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To sum up, on the intraparty dimension, the 2008 elections brought fewer 
candidates associated with corruption practices. While this may be a good indication 
that the reform has reached one of its principal goals, it is difficult to appreciate how 
much of the change is attributable to the reform and how much to idiosyncratic events. 
The interviews however, reveal that under the new system wealthy and populist 
candidates prosper. The reform was meant to increase MP responsiveness to voters, 
which should translate into more popular input in the legislation process. The 
interviews reveal serious barriers in the transmission of popular concerns to MPs. MPs 
have little interest in pursuing a local agenda for most issues are still framed at the 
national rather than local level. 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
This study evaluates the 2008 Romanian electoral reform within the well-
known framework developed by Shugart (2003). At the onset, the Romanian electoral 
law presented itself as a serious alternative to existing mixed systems for it yields 
proportional results, while having all MPs elected in single member districts. It gave 
reformers the prospect of combining the best of both worlds: individual accountability 
and proportionality. 
The analysis however, identifies a series of shortcomings, and thus paints a 
rather somber image of the reform. Some of these shortcomings are specific to the 
Romanian case, while others are more general lessons about accountability and 
proportionality in elections. Some of the shortcomings are a function of the novelty of 
the system and may disappear; others reflect structural problems and are likely to stay. 
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Regarding proportionality, the study finds that what Duverger (1972) calls 
psychological aspect of the wasted vote problem is valid in the absence of 
disproportionality. Although the Romanian system translates votes into seats 
proportionately, supporters of smaller parties are still discouraged from voting for 
their party. There are two possible explanations. First, before the 2008 elections most 
voters were unaware of the redistribution system, and thus might have acted as they 
would under a plurality system. This may simply be a function of novelty decreasing 
over time. Second, the wasted votes may be the consequence of a rational choice 
between determining the fate of the district or the fate of the country overall. This 
mechanism is unrelated to the novelty of the elections, and to the extent that it is at 
work, it should create the wasted vote problem in the future. 
Regarding accountability, the study suggests that the new law has increased the 
capacity of voters to throw the rascals out, and that voters have taken advantage of it. 
Fewer corrupt candidates were elected to the parliament in 2008 than in 2004. 
Unfortunately, with the data at hand it is hard to establish to what extent this is the 
result of the reform or of idiosyncratic events.  
The analysis also points to negative traits of the new MPs. Thus, running in 
single member districts increases the benefit of individual campaign funds, which 
leads to wealthy candidates being selected by parties, and then elected by voters at the 
polls. This phenomenon is exacerbated by the sparse government funding of electoral 
campaigns. Also, the paper finds that the single member district system has brought to 
the parliament popular figures with little knowledge of political realities and needs of 
their constituents.  
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The paper also challenges some of the accepted benefits of accountability. It 
shows that increasing individual accountability does not necessarily translate into 
better representation of constituency interests in the legislative process. Because 
Romania is a unitary state very few issues have different implications for constituents 
based on the district where they live. As a consequence, very few channels for 
transmitting constituency preferences have developed. The only such channel—the 
weekly meetings—falls short of meeting its purpose, since most requests regard 
concrete things related to day-to-day needs as opposed to more abstract requests 
related to an MP’s role—to legislate. This raises more general questions about how 
prepared citizens are to participate in the legislative process, and implicitly about the 
utility of increasing individual accountability in general, and in unitary states in 
particular. Individual accountability not only fails to fulfill its promise, but it 
encourages clientelistic ties between representatives and constituencies. In Romania, 
directing funds to local communities (buying off votes) has become an important tool 
for voter appreciation in the post-reform era.  
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Table 1.1: Description of vote data from 33 parliaments together with descriptive statistics for system level 
variables.  
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Argentina 64 Dec '93- Dec ‘95 0.76 0 1 0.14 45 1 2.82 11 2.66 
Australia 457 May 96-July '98 0.99 1 0 0.5 15 1 2.56 77 16.92 
Belgium 454 July '99- July '00 0.99 1 0 0.23 75 1 9.05 80 37.83 
Brazil 452 March '95- Dec '98 0.80 0 1 0.53 0 1 8.04 9 9.82 
Canada 735 May '94- April '97 0.87 1 0 0.6 25 1 2.35 75 21 
 Chile 522 Oct '98- May '00 0.85 0 1 0.43 0 0 5.14 10 26.1 
Czech R. 4741 Jan '93- June '96 0.92 1 0 0.31 81 0 4.80 4 131.69 
Denmark 427 June '06- June '07 0.99 1 0 0.43 25 0 4.89 87 35.58 
Ecuador 22 July '98- June '02 0.92 0 1 0.11 65 0 4.69 20 0.26 
Estonia 681 Jan ’08- Dec ‘08 0.98 1 0 0.5 30 0 4.38 18 56.75 
Finland 723 Sept ‘07- August ‘08 0.95 1 1 0.41 85 0 5.13 88 60.25 
France 394 Jan ‘08- Dec ‘09 0.96 1 1 0.6 55 0 2.48 64 16.41 
Germany 94 Jan ‘96- Dec ‘97 0.98 1 0 0.45 60 1 3.44 48 3.91 
Greece 79 March ’04- July ‘07 0.91 1 0 0.37 87 0 2.19 30 1.88 
Hungary 2496 Jan '08- Dec '08 0.97 1 0 0.41 70 0 2.32 19 208 
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Israel 598 Oct '99- Nov'00 0.55 1 0 0.05 55 0 8.69 52 42.71 
Italy 2906 Jan '09- Dec '09 0.90 1 0 0.52 35 0 3.06 62 242.16 
Latvia 2006 Jan '08- Dec '08 0.91 1 0 0.43 0 0 6.00 18 167.16 
Lithuania 1576 Jan '08- Dec '08 0.87 1 0 0.53 38 0 5.82 18 131.33 
Mexico 299 Oct '98- April '00 0.91 0 1 0.46 85 1 2.85 2 15.73 
Netherlands 20 Dec '06- March '09 0.99 1 0 0.14 20 0 5.6 62 0.71 
New Zealand 592 Nov '90- August '93 0.96 1 0 0.6 0 0 1.76 71 17.93 
Peru 689 March '99- June '00 0.70 0 1 0.59 0 0 2.91 1 43.06 
Philippines 147 July '95- April '97 0.66 0 1 0.6 0 0 3.36 9 6.68 
Poland 2183 Jan '08- Dec '08 0.95 1 1 0.42 20 0 2.82 18 181.91 
Romania 1102 Jan '07- Dec '07 0.84 1 1 0.11 8 0 4.56 12 91.83 
Slovakia 411 Oct '07- Sept '08 0.98 1 0 0.52 63 0 4.80 15 34.25 
Slovenia 381 Jan ’08- Oct ‘08 0.93 1 1 0.21 73 0 4.91 18 38.1 
Sweden 532 Sept '07- August '08 0.99 1 0 0.4 60 0 4.15 88 44.33 
Switzerland 690 Jan '07- Dec '07 0.60 0 0 0.39 0 1 4.99 88 57.5 
U. K. 238 Jan '07- Dec '07 0.97 1 0 0.6 5 0 2.45 88 19.83 
United States 987 Jan '09- Dec '09 0.84 0 1 0.6 5 1 1.93 90 82.25 
Uruguay 22 Dec '90- August '94 0.76 0 1 0.42 40 0 3.33 6 0.45 
 
Note: The sources for each variable can be found in Appendix 1 B.  
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Table 1.2: Descriptions of variables. 
 
Note: “s” refers to system-level and “p” to party-level variables. 
 
 
Predictor Description 
Confidence (s) Dummy variable where “1” indicates that the party comes from a 
country with vote of confidence procedure. 
Personal 
accountability (s) 
Index measuring whether the electoral system encourages the 
development of personal accountability, based on Hallerberg and 
Marier  (2004).  The index runs from “0,” for a system that fully 
encourages party accountability to “1,” for a system that fully 
encourages personal accountability.  
Candidate selection 
(p) 
Dummy variable where a score of “1” means that the party leaders 
control the nomination procedure, and a score of “0” means that local 
organizations control it.  
Campaign Subsidies 
(s) 
The proportion of funds spent by parties in electoral campaigns that 
come from the government.  
Presidential (s) Dummy variable where “1” means that the party comes from a system 
with a popularly elected president. 
Government party (p) Dummy variable where “1” indicates that the party is in government at 
the time of the vote. 
Control variables  
Federal (s) Dummy variable where “1” indicates that the party comes from a 
federal system. 
EFNP (s) Effective number of parties computed based on the formula developed 
by Laakso and Taagepera (1979):  where n is the 
number of parties with at least one seat and pi2 is the square of party i’s 
proportion of seats. 
Age of regime (s) The number of years from the establishment of democratic order until 
the first vote in the database. 
Vote frequency (s) The number of votes recorded divided by the period in which they 
were recorded expressed in months. 
Seat share (p) The percent of seats that the party holds in the parliament. 
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Table 1.3: Predictors of vote unity in 33 parliaments. 
Predictor M 1 M 2 M 3 M 4 M 5 M 6 M7 M 8 M 9 
Main Predictors          
          
Personal accountability 
 
-.0010 
(.1481) 
 
-.3880*** 
(.1484) 
 
-.3239** 
(.1645) 
-.2276 
(.1452) 
    -.1539 
(.1543) 
Candidate selection  -.1784** 
(.0712) 
-.1252* 
(.0747) 
-.1142 
(.0720) 
    -.0940 
(.0744) 
          
Personal accountability* 
Candidate selection 
 .5547*** 
(.1663) 
.4151** 
(.1792) 
.3101* 
(.1681) 
    .2832 
(.1736) 
          
Campaign subsidies     .0014** 
(.0006) 
.0007 
(.0006) 
  .0007 
(.0005) 
          
Confidence 
 
  
 
 .1557*** 
(.0373) 
 
 .1506*** 
(.0530) 
.1697*** 
(.047) 
 
.1425*** 
(.0512) 
.1306*** 
(.0490) 
Presidential 
 
      .0379 
(.044) 
 
.0074 
(.0501) 
-.0014 
(.0402) 
Government party        .0353 
(.0310) 
.0077 
(.0283) 
          
Government party* 
Presidential  
       -.0168 
(.0451) 
.0008 
(.0394) 
          
Control Variables          
          
Federal  -.0390 
(.0514) 
 -.0192 
(.0394) 
.0204 
(.0315) 
-.0342 
(.0474) 
.0188 
(.0454) 
  .0136 
(.0329) 
          
ENPS -.0066 
(.0129) 
 .0036 
(.0096) 
.0012 
(.0073) 
-.0084 
(.0107) 
-.0121 
(.0094) 
  .0028 
(.0078) 
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Age of regime  .0008 
(.0007) 
 .0009* 
(.0005) 
-.00008 
(.00047) 
 
.0009 
(.0006) 
-.0001 
(.0006) 
  .00004 
(.00049) 
Vote frequency .0002 
(.0003) 
 .00006 
(.00025) 
 
-.0002 
(.0002) 
.0002 
(.0003) 
-.0001 
(.0003) 
  -.0002 
(.0002) 
Seat share 
 
.0019*** 
(.0007) 
 
 
.0016** 
(.0006) 
.0016 ** 
(.0006) 
 
.0019*** 
(.0007) 
.0019*** 
(.0007) 
  .0015** 
(.0007) 
Constant .8456*** 
(.1033) 
1.025*** 
(.0668) 
 
 
.9215*** 
(.1013) 
 
.8505*** 
(.0892) 
.7982*** 
(.0672) 
.7816*** 
(.0597) 
.7451*** 
(0.05) 
 
.7673*** 
(.0568) 
.7929*** 
(.1086) 
N partiesa 
 
235 207 207 207 235 235 235 235 236 
N legislatures 
 
33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Variance explained 
 
         
System level 
 
.12 .28 .33 .61 .24 .43 .35 .36 .65 
Party level 
 
.03 .01 .03 .04 .03 .03 - .002 .04 
          
 
Notes: The entries are GLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; ***<.01; **<.05; *<.1 
a The number of parties varies across models because data on candidate selection was not available for some parties.  
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Table 1.4: Marginal effect of personal vote. 
 Marginal effect of personal accountability Standard error 
Leadership 
controlled selection .167
a .106b 
 
Locally controlled 
selection -.388* .148 
*<.01 
The values are computed based on the results in Model 2.  
a Computed by adding the beta coefficients for Personal vote and Personal 
vote*Candidate selection. 
b Computed as  , where  and  are the coefficients 
for the regression terms Personal vote and Personal vote*Candidate selection.  
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Table 1.5: Predictors of electoral campaign subsidies in 36 democracies  
Predictor  
Confidence 23.14* 
(11.46) 
ENPS -.07 
(2.60) 
Economic 
freedoma 
-1.58* 
(.70) 
GDP per 
capitab 
.63 
(.53) 
Constant 113.85* 
(43.77) 
N 36 
R-squared .23 
*>.05 
Notes: The entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; the unit 
of analysis is the country;  
a Source: Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom. The index runs from “1” 
meaning full state control of the economy to “100” meaning the least possible state 
intervention in the economy. Found at: http://www.heritage.org/index/  
The expectation is that level of government involvement in campaign finance is lower 
in countries with strong traditions of free market economies, an expectation supported 
by the data (see Nassmacher 2009, 147).  
 
b Expressed as thousands of PPP American dollars. Source: CIA- The World 
Factbook. Found at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
The expectation is that wealthier countries have more budgetary resources and 
therefore are more likely to fund electoral campaigns.  
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Table 1.6: Predictors of leadership control over candidate selection in 36 
democracies.  
Predictor  
Confidence 7.33** 
(2.44) 
Seat share 0.005 
(0.008) 
District 
magnitudea 
-.005 
(.022) 
Areab -.0004 
(.0003) 
ENPS -.714 
(.481) 
GDP per capita -.164* 
(.089) 
Constant 4.601* 
(2.719) 
N parties 220 
N countries 36 
*<.1; **<.01 
Notes: The entries are random-effects GLS coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses;  
a The average number of representatives elected per district in each country. Source: 
Wallack et al, 2003. 
The expectation is that leadership control is easier in large multi-member 
constituencies because coordination in compiling party lists is easier; also voters have 
less personal knowledge of the candidates (Lundell 2004, 33).   
 
b The area of the country expressed in thousands of square kilometers. Source: CIA- 
The World Factbook. Found at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/ 
Two contending expectations about its effect have emerged in the literature. On one 
hand large territories require an extensive party organization, characterized by 
hierarchy, which may encourage centralized nomination. On the other hand in large 
polities central leaders have less knowledge of the local political leaders, which makes 
the efforts of centralizing nominations more difficult (Lundell 2004, 35).  
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Table 1.7: Predictors of ideological disunity in parties 
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Table 2.1: Incentives for personal or party reputations before and after the electoral 
reform. 
Method Pre-Reform After Reform 
 Ballota Poola Votesa Districtb Ballota Poola Votesa District 
Carey and 
Shugart 
0 0 0 8.17 
0 0 0 1 
Wallack et al. 0 0 0 8.17 1 1d 2 1 
Hallerberg and 
Marier indexc  .05 .1 
Notes: a Ordinal variable with three categories “0”, “1”, and “2”. A score of “0” 
signifies incentives for personal votes, while a score of “2” signifies incentives for 
party votes. 
b The information about the size of district was taken from Wallack et al. (2003). 
c The index goes from “0” meaning extreme incentives for party vote to “1” meaning 
extreme incentives for personal vote. The values were computed based on the formula 
developed by Hallerberg and Marier (2004).  
d Walack et al. (2003) give SMD systems a score of “2” on the Pool variable because 
they consider that the electoral success of the party does not determine individual 
careers. The Romanian system is a bit complicated in this regard. Candidates in SMDs 
rely on their own abilities to outperform candidates from other parties in the district as 
well as from their own parties in different districts in their constituency. At the same 
time those who gain their seats at redistribution come from constituencies that did well 
at the national level, when compared to other constituencies. To this end a candidate 
relies on the fortunes of other party colleagues from different districts in the same 
constituency. To account for this aspect I give the new system a score of “1” on the 
Pool variable.  
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Table 2.2: List of predictors used in the statistical analyses. 
Predictor Description Source 
Party-level 
variables (Table 3) 
  
Government The party is in government at the time of the 
vote 
Stan and Zaharia, 
2009 
Vote-level variables 
(Table 3) 
  
Post reform Dummy variable where “0” represents a vote 
that took place before the electoral reform 
and “1” represents a vote taken after the 
reform  
Romanian 
Chamber of 
Deputies website 
 
Final vote Dummy variable where “1” represents a final 
vote on a piece of legislation, and “0” 
represents all other votes. 
Romanian 
Chamber of 
Deputies website 
Organic law Dummy variable where “1” represents a final 
vote on an organic law and “0” represents a 
vote on an ordinary law. 
Romanian 
Chamber of 
Deputies website 
Deputy-level 
variables (Tables 3 
and 5) 
  
Post reform  Dummy variable where “0” represents a 
deputy elected in 2004 on closed lists and “1” 
represents a deputy elected in 2008 in a 
single member district 
Romanian 
Chamber of 
Deputies website 
 
Party group leader The deputy is a president, vice-president or 
secretary of her party group. 
Romanian 
Chamber of 
Deputies website 
Both terms The deputy has served in both the 2004-2008 
and the 2008-2012 term. 
Romanian 
Chamber of 
Deputies website 
Government The deputy’s party is in the government party 
coalition 
Stan and Zaharia, 
2009 
Parliament leader The deputy is president or vice-president of 
the Chamber 
Romanian 
Chamber of 
Deputies website 34568!9:6!M4@>;=>;!N:>@J6<!4A!O6GI5=67!F6J7=568!FFF'B?6G'<4!!
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Predictor Model 1 Model 2  
 Coeff. St. error P>|t| Coeff. St. 
error 
P>|t| Marginal effects 
Post reform 0.339 0.052 0.00 0.363 0.052 0.00 
Final vote -0.178 0.018 0.00 -0.223 0.052 0.00 
Final vote* Post reform -0.481 0.059 0.00 -0.473 0.059 0.00 
Organic law    0.121 0.023 0.00 
Party group leader 
Both terms 
Government 
Parliament leader 
 
   -0.073 
-0.031 
-0.394 
0.437 
0.029 
0.020 
0.030 
0.063 
0.01 
0.13 
0.00 
0.00 
Party effects       
PSD 1.050 0.029 0.00 0.715 0.039 0.00 
PNL 0.303 0.033 0.00 0.245 0.034 0.00 
UDMR 0.670 0.040 0.00 0.615 0.041 0.00 
PRM 1.737 0.034 0.00 1.345 0.045 0.00 
PC 1.053 0.041 0.00 1.032 0.041 0.00 
Constant -3.373 0.028 0.00 -2.978 0.041 0.00 
Pseudo  R2  0.04   0.04  
-0.006 
0.011 
-0.010 
0.003 
-0.002 
-0.001 
-0.012 
0.014 
 
 
0.026 
0.007 
0.022 
0.069 
0.045 
N 
Log likelihood  
238908 
-53703.476 
238908 
-53703.476 
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 Legislative proposals Questions addressed 
Predictor Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef. St. 
eerror 
P>|z| Coef. St. 
eerror 
P>|z| Coef. St. 
eerror 
P>|z| Coef. St. 
error 
P>|z| 
Individual 
characteristics 
            
Post reform 2.16 0.08 0.00 1.92 0.12 0.00 0.54 0.14 0.00 0.81 0.21 0.00 
Party group 
leader 
   0.11 0.11 0.31    0.11 0.22 0.61 
Both terms    0.27 0.07 0.00    0.28 0.14 0.04 
Government    0.40 0.14 0.00    -0.46 0.26 0.08 
Parliament 
leader 
   -0.25 0.25 0.32    -0.87 0.51 0.08 
Party fixed 
effects 
            
PSD -0.38 0.09 0.00 -0.41 0.09 0.00 -0.10 0.17 0.56 -0.14 0.17 0.42 
PNL -0.17 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.55 0.11 0.17 0.57 -0.15 0.25 0.56 
UDMR -0.48 0.16 0.00 -0.31 0.18 0.08 -0.73 0.28 0.00 -1.00 0.32 0.00 
PRM 1.17 0.17 0.00 1.37 0.17 0.00 0.28 0.33 0.40 0.26 0.34 0.44 
PC 0.74 0.18 0.00 0.85 0.19 0.00 0.29 0.34 0.40 0.06 0.37 0.87 
Constant -3.97 0.09 0.00 -4.17 0.10 0.00 -2.87 0.16 0.00 -2.85 0.19 0.00 
N 607 607 607 607 
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.14 0.008 0.01 
Log likelihood  -1611.1914 -1599.1355 -1711.3364 -1705.6991 
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 Legislative proposals 
per day 
Questions addressed 
per day 
Average 2009 0.160 0.144 
Average 2005 0.021 0.077 
Difference 0.139 0.067 
t-value 7.634 2.024 
P>|t| 0.000 0.046 
N 89 89 !
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PSDb 28.3 34.3 27.7 34.3 23.1 28.7 21.5 26.5 37.1 46.4 36.6 44.9 37.2 41.6 36.8 39.7 34.2c 35.8c 33.1c 34.1c 
CDR 20.2 23.8 20 24 30.7 37.1 30.2 35.7 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
PDLb 10.4 12.6 10.2 12.6 13.2c 16.1c 12.9c 15.4c 7.6 9.3 7 9 -- -- -- -- 33.6 37.2 32.4 34.4 
PUNR 8.1 9.8 7.7 8.8 4.2 4.9 4.4 5.2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
UDMR 7.6 8.4 7.5 7.9 6.8 7.7 6.6 7.3 6.9 8.6 6.8 7.8 6.2 7.3 6.2 6.6 6.4 6.6 6.2 6.6 
PDAR 3.3 3.5 2.9 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
PRM 3.8 4.2 3.9 4.7 4.5 5.6 4.5 5.2 21 26.4 19.4 24.3 13.6 15.3 13 14.4 3.6 -- 3.1 -- 
PSM 3.2 3.5 3 3.8 -- -- ,,! -- -- ,,! -- -- ,,! -- -- ,,! -- -- ,,! -- 
PNL -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 7.5 9.3 6.9 8.7 -- -- -- -- 18.7 20.4 18.6 19.5 
DA -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 31.8 35.8 31.5 33.7 -- -- -- -- -./012!345/6!475.8691!450!41!:.;;.<12!*+!,)+&-"(.)!/0&-%(1"-)*(%123)4!5,!/0&-%(1"-)4&67/61"&6)&8)5&0(6"(3)*!9,)9":/%(.)
!/0&-%(1"-)*(%123)*;<5=)5&0(6"(6)<(1"&6(.);6"12)*(%123);!>5,!/0&-%(1"-)?.."(6-/)&8)@A6B(%"(6#)"6)5&0(6"(3)*!?5,)
?B%(%"(6)!/0&-%(1"-)*(%12)&8)5&0(6"(3)*5>,C%/(1/%)5&0(6"()*(%123)*+>,+&-"(."#1)*(%12)&8)9(:&%3)*<9,<(1"&6(.)9":/%(.)
*(%123)!?,)DA#1"-/)(6E)F%A1G)?.."(6-/')
(!=>1?5.?.5/>.84;>/6!.:!0;07/.54;!161/09!7.9?@/0A!B410A!.8!/C0!:.59@;4!A0D0;.?0A!B6!E4;;4FC05!G+""+H2! I!<C050!7")>1!/C0!?05708/4F0!.:!D./01!48A!#")>1!/C0!?05708/4F0!.:!104/1!.B/4>80A!B6!?45/6!"'!!B=08./01!?45/>01!/C4/!C4D0!7C48F0A!/C0>5!8490!475.11!/>90J!/C0!475.869!50:051!/.!/C0!9.1/!50708/!8490!7!=08./01!0;07/>.81!>8!<C>7C!/C0!?45/6!<41!>8!4;;>4870!<>/C!4!9>8.5!?45/6% 
 
!!! ""!
""!
!"#$%&'()*&!+%&,%$"-./01+.2&#%-3%%0&2",-4&5$/1%0%11&"06&7/-%&5+/.5%&.0&
-+%&)889&0"-./0"$&%$%5-./01(&
& :;<!=&>?@ABCBAA&&! !"#$ !%"$ !&#$ '"()$$
!"#$ #$%!&"'()*+! ,! -! .!
!%"$ /!! #,"!&"$(-*+! #! 00!
!&#$ 00!! #! ".!&--(,*+! 00!
'"()$ 00!! .! 00!! ,-!&"'()*+!
*+,-)$ #!! #! #! 00!
+*+.#$ #$'!! #)'! .%,! ,"!
D
@
!
B&
>E
@
F>
B&
1234567!#%%-!834296:;!125<:=!134>6?!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!!! .%%!
.%%!
!"#$%&'('*&!+%&,%$"-./01+.2&#%-3%%0&2",-4&5$/1%0%11&"06&7/-%&5+/.5%&.0&
-+%&)88G&BH,/2%"0&%$%5-./01(&
& :;<!=&>?@ABCBAA&!! !"#$ !%"$ !&#$ '"()$
!"#$ ""!&",()+! )! .! 00!
!%"$ #! ...!&".('*+! .! 00!
!&#$ 00! #! )'!&"/("*+! 00!
'"()$ 00! #! 00! #)!&.%%*+!
*+,-)$
$ /! #! 00! 00!
$
+*+.#$ .%$! .#.! )"! #)!
D
@
!
B&
>E
@
F>
B&
1234567!#%%"!834296:;!8=65@<2;A!134>6? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!!! .%.!
.%.!
!"#$%&'(I*&!+%&:,%1%05%&"06&AH55%11&/J&>/,,H2-&>"06.6"-%1&.0&-+%&)88I&
"06&)889&</K"0."0&B$%5-./01&! )88I& )889&
>/,,H2-&5"06.6"-%1& $/! //!
B$%5-%6& )-!&')*+! ,#!&/-*+!
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Figures 
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Notes: Marginal effects are computed based on Model 2 in Table 3. 
Since all other variables are dichotomous, they are kept at their mode.  
The confidence intervals are set at 95%. 
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Figure 3.1: Positioning of democracies on Shugart’s index of interparty 
efficiency. 
!
Notes: Country acronyms are as follows: AU- Australia; BE-Belgium; CA- Canada; 
CO- Colombia; DE- Germany; DK- Denmark; ES- Spain; FI- Finland; FR- France; 
GB- Great Britain; GR- Greece; IE- Ireland; IL- Israel; IT- Italy; JP- Japan; NL- 
Netherlands; NO- Norway; NZ- New Zealand; PT- Portugal; RO- Romania; SE- 
Sweden; US- United States; VE- Venezuela.  
The countries are only positioned on the horizontal dimension. Vertical 
arrangements are for visibility purposes.  
Sources:  Romania- computed using the method used by Shugart; all other countries- 
Shugart. 
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Figure 3.2: Proportion of members of parliament who served in the previous 
term. 
!
Sources: Romanian Senate official website, accessed at www.senat.ro ; Romanian 
Chamber of Deputies official website, accessed at www.cdep.ro .  
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Appendix 1: Additional analyses of vote behavior in national parliaments. 
Table A 1. Determinants of party vote loses in 33 parliaments 
Predictor M 1 M 2 M 3 M 4 M 5 M 6 M7 M 8 M 9 
Main Predictors          
          
Personal accountability 
 
1.003 
(1.724) 
 
5.348** 
(2.246) 
 
2.678 
(2.339) 
.762 
(2.215) 
    -.247 
(2.273) 
Candidate selection  3.093*** 
(.742) 
1.383* 
(.767) 
.597 
(.797) 
    -.045 
(.805) 
          
Personal accountability* 
Candidate selection 
 -4.726** 
(2.115) 
-1.781 
(2.184) 
.584 
(2.289) 
    1.891 
(2.318) 
          
Campaign subsidies     -.018** 
(.008) 
-.006 
(.008) 
  -.001 
(.008) 
          
Confidence 
 
  
 
 -2.364*** 
(.681) 
 
 -2.159*** 
(.709) 
-1.399** 
(.662) 
 
-1.388** 
(.664) 
-2.344*** 
(.839) 
Presidential 
 
      -.155 
(.615) 
 
-.274 
(.618) 
.079 
(.610) 
Government party        .231 
(.092) 
-.594*** 
(.096) 
          
Government party* 
Presidential  
       .257* 
(.152) 
.296* 
(.167) 
          
Control Variables          
          
Federal  1.290 
(.637) 
 1.372** 
(.672) 
-.301 
(.706) 
.95* 
(.567) 
-.580 
(.705) 
  -.228 
(.704) 
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ENPS .170 
(.174) 
 .071 
(.172) 
.096 
(.130) 
.125 
(.148) 
.168 
(.127) 
  .149 
(.136) 
          
Age of regime  -.015* 
(.008) 
 -.013 
(.009) 
-.007 
(.007) 
 
-.019** 
(.007) 
-.007 
(.008) 
  -.009 
(..008) 
Vote frequency .0009 
(.004) 
 .0006 
(.004) 
 
.005 
(.004) 
.002 
(.004) 
.006 
(.004) 
  .006 
(.004) 
Seat share 
 
.057*** 
(.003) 
 
 
.037*** 
(.004) 
.037*** 
(.004) 
 
.057*** 
(.003) 
.057*** 
(.003) 
  .047*** 
(.004) 
Constant -7.613*** 
(1.258) 
-8.285*** 
(.976) 
 
 
-7.949*** 
(1.478) 
 
-6.024*** 
(1.341) 
-6.244*** 
(.881) 
-5.817*** 
(.854) 
-4.430*** 
(.723) 
 
-4.510*** 
(.725) 
-5.934*** 
(1.669) 
N partiesa 
 
230 201 207 207 230 230 230 230 201 
N legislatures 
 
33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
          
 
Notes: The entries are poisson random effects coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; ***<.01; **<.05; *<.1; 
the dependent variable counts the number of times a party got rolled (unsuccessfully tried to defend the status quo) or 
got stuffed (was not successful at passing a bill although they would have had enough votes). 
a The number of parties varies across models because data on candidate selection was not available for some parties.  !!!!
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Table A 2. Determinants of vote unity in 19 national parliaments.   
Predictor M 1 M 2 M 3 M 4 M 5 M 6 M7 M 8 M 9 
Main Predictors          
          
Personal accountability 
 
.193 
(.290) 
 
-.254 
(.218) 
 
-.177 
(.293) 
.023 
(.247) 
    -.034 
(.217) 
Candidate selection  -.111 
(.083) 
-.084 
(.087) 
-.067 
(.082) 
    -.077 
(.083) 
          
Personal accountability* 
Candidate selection 
 .367* 
(.187) 
.279 
(.257) 
.212 
(.230) 
    .275 
(.213) 
          
Campaign subsidies     .0019* 
(.0011) 
.0003 
(0012) 
  .0004 
(.0006) 
          
Confidence 
 
  
 
 .241*** 
(.066) 
 
 .278** 
(.122) 
.175** 
(.084) 
 
.175** 
(.074) 
.205*** 
(.067) 
Presidential 
 
      .008 
(.067) 
 
.009 
(.063) 
-.003 
(.041) 
Government party        .030 
(.034) 
.005 
(.025) 
          
Government party* 
Presidential  
       -.003 
(.051) 
.001 
(.036) 
          
Control Variables          
          
Federal  -.137 
(.116) 
 -.149* 
(.082) 
.013 
(.072) 
-.072 
(.110) 
.080 
(.116) 
  .006 
(.056) 
          
ENPS .009 
(.026) 
 .009 
(.020) 
-.009 
(.015) 
-.013 
(.020) 
-.037* 
(.020) 
  -.009 
(.013) 
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Age of regime  .0006 
(.0012) 
 .001 
(.001) 
.0001 
(.0007) 
 
-.0002 
(.0011) 
-.0004 
(.0010) 
  .0002 
(.0005) 
Vote frequency -.0003 
(.0006) 
 .00008 
(.0004) 
 
-.0005 
(.0003) 
.0002 
(.0005) 
-.0005 
(.0005) 
  -.0005 
(.0003) 
Seat share 
 
.003*** 
(.001) 
 
 
.002*** 
(.0007) 
.002*** 
(.0007) 
 
.003*** 
(.001) 
.003*** 
(.001) 
  .002*** 
(.0007) 
Constant .683*** 
(.234) 
.976*** 
(.088) 
 
 
.841*** 
(.204) 
 
.734*** 
(.163) 
.806*** 
(.131) 
.829*** 
(.115) 
.734*** 
(.091) 
 
.720*** 
(.081) 
.751*** 
(.163) 
N partiesa 
 
141 121 121 121 141 141 141 141 121 
N legislatures 
 
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Variance explained 
 
         
System level 
 
.15 .18 .36 .73 .29 .50 .28 .31 .75 
Party level 
 
.07 .002 .09 .09 .07 .07 - .005 .09 
          
 
Notes: The entries are GLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; ***<.01; **<.05; *<.1.  
a The number of parties varies across models because data on candidate selection was not available for some parties.  
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Table A 3. Determinants of party vote loses in 19 parliaments. 
Predictor M 1 M 2 M 3 M 4 M 5 M 6 M7 M 8 M 9 
Main Predictors          
          
Personal accountability 
 
2.359 
(1.924) 
 
9.701*** 
(3.714) 
 
7.699** 
(3.212) 
5.166 
(3.322) 
    6.044* 
(3.668) 
Candidate selection  4.509*** 
(1.084) 
3.056*** 
(1.052) 
2.574** 
(1.057) 
    2.322** 
(1.111) 
          
Personal accountability* 
Candidate selection 
 -8.905*** 
(3.177) 
-6.409** 
(3.040) 
-4.985 
(3.060) 
    -4.720 
(3.229) 
          
Campaign subsidies     -.014 
(.011) 
.002 
(.010) 
  .015 
(.012) 
          
Confidence 
 
  
 
 -2.179* 
(1.236) 
 
 -3.158** 
(1.268) 
-2.370*** 
(.830) 
 
-2.355*** 
(.826) 
-2.615* 
(1.415) 
Presidential 
 
      -.668 
(.690) 
 
-1.008 
(.691) 
.407 
(1.006) 
Government party        .214** 
(.093) 
-.530*** 
(.099) 
          
Government party* 
Presidential  
       .608*** 
(.179) 
.646*** 
(.199) 
          
Control Variables          
          
Federal  4.073*** 
(.975) 
 4.938*** 
(1.154) 
3.090* 
(1.597) 
3.517*** 
(1.089) 
1.420 
(1.394) 
  3.115** 
(1.579) 
          
          
ENPS .202 
(.211) 
 .216 
(.248) 
.353 
(.230) 
.149 
(.190) 
.407** 
(.198) 
  .503* 
(.271) 
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Age of regime  -.043*** 
(.011) 
 -.048*** 
(.013) 
-.043*** 
(.014) 
 
-.042*** 
(.011) 
-.034*** 
(.011) 
  -.047*** 
(.014) 
Vote frequency -.0004 
(.0046) 
 .006 
(.005) 
 
.012** 
(.006) 
.002 
(.005) 
.010** 
(.005) 
  .014** 
(.006) 
Seat share 
 
.058*** 
(.003) 
 
 
.030*** 
(.004) 
.030*** 
(.004) 
 
.058*** 
(.003) 
.058*** 
(.003) 
  .039*** 
(.005) 
Constant -7.775*** 
(1.703) 
-9.965*** 
(1.474) 
 
 
-10.49*** 
(2.351) 
 
-9.036*** 
(2.339) 
-6.235*** 
(1.159) 
-6.412*** 
(1.136) 
-3.530*** 
(.901) 
 
-3.631*** 
(.897) 
-10.55*** 
(3.321) 
N partiesa 
 
136 115 115 115 136 136 136 136 115 
N legislatures 
 
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
          
 
Notes: The entries are poisson random effects coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; ***<.01; **<.05; *<.1; 
the dependent variable counts the number of times a party got rolled (unsuccessfully tried to defend the status quo) or 
got stuffed (was not successful at passing a bill although they would have had enough votes). 
a The number of parties varies across models because data on candidate selection was not available for some parties. 
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Appendix 2: Coding rules for variables together with the sources used 
1. Adjusted Weighted Rice Index 
This measurement is obtained in three steps. First, I compute Rice indexes for each 
party in each vote based on the widely accepted formula developed by Rice (1925). 
The index for party i in vote j equals: 
 
where the two terms in the absolute value formula represent the number of positive 
and negative votes expressed as proportions of those voting aye or nay. 
These scores are then averaged based on a formula developed by Carey (2007; 2009) 
that gives more weight to contested votes. The weighted rice is computed based on 
the formula 
 
where 
 
THRESHOLD represents the percentage of positive votes needed to pass the vote. 
Furthermore, the final scores are adjusted for small party bias (see Desposato 2005) 
based on the formula used in Carey (2009): 
 
 
where Ni is the number of members in the party group.   ,         Dij= 
minimum [AYE, NAY] as percentage of those voting, and numvotes  is the total 
number of votes in which party i takes part.  
Sources: 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czech R., Ecuador, Israel, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay: 
Carey, John M. 2010.  Carey data archive.  www.dartmouth.edu/~jcarey 
 
US: Poole, Keith. 2010. Keith Poole’s Database. Found at: 
http://voteview.com/dwnl.htm  
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 Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, 
UK: personal dataset; see Appendix 3 for details.  
 
2. Confidence 
Dummy variable where “1” signifies parties from countries with vote of confidence 
procedure and “0” countries without the procedure.  
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profiles 
 
3. Presidential 
Dummy variable where “1’ signifies parties from countries with heads of state elected 
through public vote.  
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profiles.  
 
4. Government party: Dummy variable where a score of “1” means that the party is 
in government at the time of the vote. 
Sources:  
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czech R., Ecuador, France, Israel, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Poland, United States, Uruguay: Carey, 
John (2009). Legislative Voting and Accountability. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom: Various December issues of the European Journal of Political Research 
“Political Data Yearbook.” 
 
5. Individual accountability 
Index developed in Hallerberg and Marier (2004) that runs from “0” meaning that the 
party comes from a system that fully encourages party accountability to “1” meaning 
a system that fully encourages individual accountability. At the origin of the index 
there is the article “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: a Rank Ordering of 
Electoral Formulas” by Carey and Shugart (1995) in which the authors enounce four 
mechanisms through which electoral rules influence the development of personal or 
party accountability. Ballot control accounts for the degree to which party leaders or 
voters control ballots. In systems where party leaders have a strong grip on the 
!!! ""$!
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candidate selection process, candidates are less likely to cultivate a personal 
reputation, whereas the opposite holds in systems where candidate selection process 
is in the hands of voters. Vote pooling taps whether votes cast for one candidate 
contribute to the number of seats the party receives in the district. If a candidate’s 
chances of election depend on the party’s ability to attract votes in the district, she 
feels more need for party reputation as opposed to personal reputation; the less 
dependent a candidate is on the fortunes of her party for election, the more likely she 
is to run a personal campaign. Vote accounts for whether the system allows the voter 
to cast a single vote for a party, multiple votes for candidates, or a single vote for a 
candidate. Systems that emphasize voting for the party lead to the development of 
party reputations, while systems in which the vote singles out candidates lead to the 
development of personal reputations1. Finally, Carey and Shugart (1995) consider the 
role of district size, which is contingent on the value of variable ballot. If party 
leaders control ballot nomination, larger districts decrease the value of personal 
reputation. If voters control the ballot, large districts make personal reputation more 
beneficial for candidates. Hallerberg and Marier (2004) add the scores on ballot, vote 
pooling and vote together to create variable a. If the system is closed list, a is divided 
by the log of the district size. In the other systems the log of the district magnitude is 
added to a. The final index is obtained by dividing this score by 10.  
 
Source for the four variables used to compute the index: Wallack et al (2003). 
 
 
6. Candidate selection 
  
Dummy variable where a score of “1” means that the party leaders control the 
nomination procedure, and a score of “0” means that local organizations control it. 
Selection is controlled in systems in which leaders influence the list of candidates 
directly and in systems in which local organizations determine the candidates, yet the 
central organization approves the final list. In all other cases candidate selection is 
considered not controlled by leaders. As the basis of this variable I use the six-point 
categorization used by Bille (2001) to characterize nomination control in Western 
democracies. Categories 1 to 4 in Bille (2001) are recoded as “controlled by 
leadership” (score of “1”) and categories 5-6 as “locally controlled nominations” 
(score of “0”). 
 
Sources: personal dataset; see Appendix 2 (available online) for details. 
 
 
7. Campaign Subsidies: The amount of government funds used in electoral 
campaign expressed as percentage of all funds used. 
 
Sources: 
 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., Uruguay, USA: Nassmacher, Karl-Heinz. 2009. The 
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Funding of Party Competition: Political Finance in 25 Democracies. Nomos 
Publishers. 
 
Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Latvia, New Zealand, Peru, 
Philippines, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Romania, Estonia, Finland, 
Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia: personal dataset; see Appendix 2 for details. 
 
 
8. Federal: Dummy variable where a score of “1” means that the party comes from a 
federal system and a score of “0” from a unitary system. 
 
Sources: 
 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czech R., Ecuador, France, Israel, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Poland, United States, Uruguay: Carey, 
John (2009). Legislative Voting and Accountability. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom: “Country Profiles,” Economist Intelligence Unit. 
 
 
9. Effective number of parties. Computed based on the formula developed by 
Laakso and Taagapera (1979). 
 
Sources:  
 
Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, 
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA: Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive. Found at: 
 http://psephos.adam-carr.net/  
 
Argentina, Uruguay: Nohlen, Dieter. 2005. Elections in the Americas. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru: “Political Database of the Americas.” Center 
for Latin American Studies at Georgetown University. Found at: 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/elecdata.html  
 
Czech R., Slovakia: “Political Transformation and Political Process in Post-
Communist Europe.” Dept. of Government, University of Essex. Found at: 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/  
 
Canada: “Elections Canada.” Found at: http://www.elections.ca/home.aspx  
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New Zealand: Vowles, Jack and Peter Aimer (1993). Voters’ Vengeance: The 1990 
Election in New Zealand and the Fate of the Fourth Labour Government. Auckland 
University Press.  
 
  
10. Age of Regime. The number of years from the establishment of democratic order 
until the first vote in the database. 
 
Source: Carey and Hix (2008). 
 
11. Vote frequency: The number of votes recorded divided by the period in which 
they were recorded expressed in months. 
Source: the vote dataset. 
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Appendix 3: Sources used for the collection of data in the personal datasets 
1. Sources for the collection of votes 
Belgium: La chambre des representants de Belgique. Found at: 
http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/cricra&language=fr&cfm=/sit
e/wwwcfm/cricra/cricragen.cfm?sess=1995960  
Denmark: Danish Folketing. Found at:  
http://www.ft.dk/?/Samling/20072/afstem/61.htm  
Estonia: Estonian Parliament. Found at: 
http://www.riigikogu.ee/?op=ems&content_type=text/html&page=haaletus_kalender
&navbar=no  
Finland:Parliament of Finland. Found at: 
http://www.eduskunta.fi/thwfakta/aanestys/aax/aax3000.shtml  
France: French Chambre des Deputees. Found at: http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/13/scrutins/table-2008-2009.asp 
Germany: Deutscher Bundestag Dokumentations und Informationssystem. Found at: 
http://dip.bundestag.de/  
Greece: Hellenic Parliament. Found at: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/Synedriaseis-
Olomeleias?search=on&SessionPeriod=4ad35afa-06c3-42cb-8575-0a46b7aff1ed  
Hungary: Hungarian Parliament. Found at: 
http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/webpar.paramform?p_ckl=38&p_modul=SZ
AV_IROM_UJ&p_szulo=-4 
Italy: Italian Chamber of Deputies. Found at: 
http://banchedati.camera.it/Votazioni/leg14/CercaVotazioni.Asp  
Latvia: Latvian Parliament. Found at: 
http://www.saeima.lv/Likumdosana/likumdosana_stenogrammas.html 
Lithuania: Lithuanian Parliament. Found at: 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w5_sale.kad_ses 
Netherlands: Dutch Parliament. Found at: 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w5_sale.kad_ses   
Poland: Polish Sejm. Found at: 
http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/SQL.nsf/posglos?OpenAgent&6  
Romania: Romanian Chamber of Deputies. Found at: 
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/eVot.Data?dat=&cal=1  
Slovakia: Slovak Parliament. Found at: http://www.nrsr.sk/nrdk/dk.aspx?Lang=sk  
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Slovenia: Slovenian Parliament. Found at: http://www.dz-rs.si/index.php?id=101   
 
Sweden: Swedish Parliament. Found at: 
http://www.riksdagen.se/Webbnav/index.aspx?nid=3150  
Switzerland: The Swiss Federal Assembly. Found at: http://www.parlament.ch/F/ra-
raete/ra-nr-nationalrat/Pages/ra-nr-abstimmungen.aspx 
UK: The Public Whip. Found at: http://www.publicwhip.org.uk/divisions.php  
2. Sources used to code candidate selection 
Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico: Alcaintara Saez, Manuel and Flavia Freidenberg. 2001. 
Partidos Politicos de America Latina. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de 
Salamanca. 
 
Australia, France, Netherlands, New Zeland, Sweden, Switzerlnd, UK: Lundell, 
Krister. 2004. “Determinants of candidate selection: the degree of centralization in 
comparative perspective.” Party Politics 10(1): 25-47. 
 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark: Bille (2001).  
 
Brazil: Jones, Mark. 2005.“The Role of Parties and Party Systems in the 
Policymaking Process.” Paper presented at the Workshop on State Reform, Public 
Policies, and Policymaking Processes, Inter-American Development Bank, 
Washington, D.C., February 28-March 2, 2005. 
 Samuels, David. 2008. “Political Ambition, Candidate Recruitment, and Legislative 
Politics in Brazil.” In Paths to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection 
in Latin America, eds. Peter Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern. University Park, PA: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 76-91.  
 
Chile: Navia, Patricio. 2008. “Legislative Candidate Selection in Chile.” In Paths to 
Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America, eds. Peter 
Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 92-118. 
 
Czech Republic: Linek, Lukas, and Petra Rakusanova. 2005. “Why Czech 
Parliamentary Party Groups Vote Less Unitedly. The Role of Frequent Voting and 
Big Majorities in Passing Bills.” Czech  Sociological Review  41( 3): 423–42. 
 
Estonia: Taagepera, Rein. 2006. “Meteoric Trajectory: The Res Publica Party in 
Estonia.” Democratization 13(1): 78-94.  
 
Finland: Gallagher, Michael. 1988. “Conclusion.” In Candidate Selection in 
Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics, eds. Michael Gallagher and 
Michael Marsh. London: Sage, 236-83. 
 
Germany: Patzelt, Werner.1999. “What Can an Individual MP do in German 
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Parliamentary Politics?” The Journal of Legislative Studies 5(3-4): 23-52 
 
                  Bille (2001).  
 
Greece: European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies. (2009, 
March). The Selection of Candidates for the European Parliament by National 
Parties and the Impact of European Political Parties. Found at: 
http://www.soc.utu.fi/sivustot/pcrc/files/mickelssonnurmi.pdf  
 
               Ashiagbor, Sefakor. 2008. Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical 
and Practical Perspectives: Selecting Candidates for Legislative Office. Washington, 
DC: National Democratic Institute.  
 
Hungary: Benoit, Kenneth. 2005. “Hungary: Holding Back the Tiers.” In The Politics 
of Electoral Systems, eds. Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 231-52. 
 
 
Israel: Lundell (2004). 
 
Italy: Wilson, Alex. 2008. “The Italian Election of April 2008: A Political 
Earthquake?” West European Politics 32 (1): 215-25.  
 
Latvia:  Centre for Public Policy Providus. 2006. “Monitoring of Anti-Corruption 
Law Making in Latvia.” Found at: 
http://www.partnershipfortransparency.info/uploads/completed%20projects/Latvia%2
0-%20Providus%20-%202006.pdf  
 
Lithuania: Clark, Terry  and Zilvinas Martinaitis. 2008. “Electoral Mandate and Party 
Cohesion: Does It Matter in Lithuania?” Journal of Communist Studies and 
Transition Politics 24(3): 317-37. 
 
Philippines: Bland, Gary. 2006. “Elections and the Development of Democratic 
Local Governance.” Paper prepared for US Agency for International Development 
Office of Democracy and Governance. Found at: 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADH475.pdf  
 
Peru: Levitsky, Stephen, and Maxwell A. Cameron. 2003. “Democracy without 
Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori’s Peru.” Latin American 
Politics and Society 45(3): 1-33. 
Poland: Szczerbiak, Aleks. 1999. “Testing Party Models in East-Central Europe: 
Local Party Organization in Postcommunist Poland.” Party Politics 5(4): 525-37. 
 
Romania: Stefan, Laurentiu. 2004. Patterns of Political Elite Recruitment in Post-
Communist Romania. Bucharest: Ziua Publishing House. 
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Slovakia: Kopecky, Petr. 2007. “Building Party Government,” In Party Politics in 
New Democracies, eds. Paul Webb and Stephen White. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Slovenia: Alenka, Kra!ovec and "tremfel, Ur!ka. 2007. “Does the Institutional 
Context Matter for Candidate Selection? Some Evidence from Slovenia.” Czech 
Journal of Political Science 3: 187-204. 
 
Uruguay: Moraes, Juan Andres. 2008. “Why Factions? Candidate Selection and 
Legislative Politics in Uruguay.” In Paths to Power: Political Recruitment and 
Candidate Selection in Latin America, eds. Peter Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern. 
University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 164-86. 
 
US: Pennings, Paul and Reuven Y. Hazan. 2001. “Democratizing Candidate 
Selection: Causes and Consequences.” Party Politics 7(3): 267-75. 
 
3. Sources used to code campaign subsidies 
Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico: Griner, Steven, and Daniel Zovatto. 2004. “De las 
normas a las buenas prácticas: el desafío del financiamiento político en América 
Latina.” San José, Costa Rica: IDEA. 
 
Belgium: Weekers, Karolien, Bart Maddens, and Jo Noppe. 2009. “Explaining the 
evolution of party finance regime in Belgium.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion 
and Parties 19(1): 25-48. 
 
Brazil: Samuels, David. “Money, Elections and Democracy in Brazil.” Latin 
American Politics and Society 43(2): 27-48.  
 
Chile, Latvia, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Switzerland: Pinto-Duschinsky, 
Michael. 2002. “Financing Politics: A Global View.” Journal of Democracy 13(4): 
69-86. 
 
Czech R., Lithuania, Romania: Roper, Stephen and Janis Ikstens. 2008. Public 
Finance and Post-Communist Party Development. Burlington, VT: Ashgate 
Publishing Company. 
 
Estonia: KOKKUVÕTE 2007. aasta Riigikogu valimistel osalenud erakondade ja 
üksikkandidaatide valimiskampaania rahastamise aruannetest. Found at: 
http://www.riigikogu.ee/public/Riigikogu/Korruptsioon/kokkuv_te_RKval2007.pdf  
 
Finland: Pierre, Jon, Lars Svassand and Anders Widfeldt. 2000. “State Subsidies to 
Political Parties: Confronting Rhetoric with Reality.” West European Politics 23(3): 
1-24. 
 
Greece: Council of Europe Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs. 
2010. Evaluation Report on Greece on Transparency of Party Funding. Found at: 
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http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoEval3(2009)9_
Greece_Two_EN.pdf  
 
Hungary: Enyedi, Zsolt. 2006. “Accounting for Organization and Financing. A 
Comparison of Four Hungarian Parties.” Europe-Asia Studies 58(7): 1101-17.  
 
Slovakia: Rybar, Marek. 2006. “Powered by the State: The Role of Public Resources 
in Party-Building in Slovakia.” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 
22(3): 320-40.  
 
Slovenia: Toplak, Jurij. 2007. “Party Funding in Slovenia.” In Political Finance and 
Corruption in Eastern Europe: The Transition Period, eds. Daniel Smilov and Jurij 
Toplak. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 171-88. 
 
4. Sources used to code party disunity 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Latvia, 
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, UK: 2008 
European Social Survey.  
Belgium: 1999 Belgian General Election Study. 
Australia, Czech Republic, New Zealand, The Philippines: 1995 World Value Survey.  
Italy, Lithuania: 2009 European Election Survey. 
Canada: 2000 World Value Survey. 
USA: 2005 World Value Survey. 
Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay: 1996 Latinobarometro. 
Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru: 1998 Latinobarometro.  
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